The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

suffers from a lack of coordination and is a good example of the chal- lenge of cooperative program devel- opment and management. USAID would like to leverage MEPI to anchor its democracy and governance programs with a view to addressing the political and institutional aspects of democratic transition. The State Department, on the other hand, is compelled to consider other, more strategic and/or commercial priorities, and as a result is more hesitant to con- front the crux of the democracy prob- lem: most of the states in the region are governed by authoritarian regimes. Daniel Brumberg underscored this assessment of MEPI: “Take a close look at the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative, and you will find a longstanding emphasis on the usual liberalization formula: economic reform, promotion of women’s rights and the building of civil society. These piecemeal reform programs are designed not to tinker with the fundamental ruling institu- tions.” Other Middle East observers and experts, while commending the president for his bold statement of principles, have expressed similar doubts and skepticism about the effi- cacy of MEPI, especially as its activi- ties are currently targeted, designed and implemented. To begin with, problems exist with MEPI’s internal administration. Individuals in the USAID Democracy & Governance Office, responsible for representing the agency in joint State Department-USAID committee meet- ings for programming decisions on MEPI, have experienced great frus- tration in their dealings with State. State Department officials reach their own decisions on how to allocate and program the money, with little input from USAID. USAID generally has very little time, sometimes less than 24 hours, to review and sign off on the State Department’s proposed program and issue a request for application to potential grantees. Anyone familiar with the USAID system of grant administration, which is designed to operate more flexibly than the con- tract procurement process, will recog- nize that it simply cannot function under these circumstances. On the receiving end of this process, representatives from U.S. nongovernmental grantees and for- profit contractors tasked with execut- ing MEPI projects, generally agree that these circumstances provide them with little chance for success. They cite several reasons. First, the accelerated project development process is often based on faulty assumptions and mis- or under- informed analysis of the implement- ing environment. Second, the pro- jects’ intended results are often unre- alistic because they generally target strengthening recipient-country, non- governmental political actors, who have little power and no formal authority to effect change at the insti- tutional level. Third, the level of funding and the life of projects are both relatively small, precluding any realistic chance of achieving lasting reform or even building a solid foun- dation. Finally, recipient-country political actors put themselves at great risk by participating in the MEPI projects. A front-page article in the Jan. 6, 2004, Washington Post detailed these risks for Egyptian subgrantees of the National Endowment for Democracy, many of whom were confronted with the choice of either refusing to use the grant funding for its intended pur- pose or going to jail. In taking this approach, the Egyptian government is hardly the exception in the region, which is dominated by authoritarian regimes considered to be strategic allies of the United States. Africa: Economic Support in Democracy Promotion Economic Support Fund monies in Africa have also been targeted at achieving “piecemeal reform,” even in countries that are considered to be U.S. strategic allies. Nigeria, the region’s most populous country boasts the second-largest USAID democracy and governance program in Africa. Compared to other, similar programs in the African region, Nigeria received one of the highest amounts by far of ESF and total funding for democracy and governance programs in both FY 2003 ($7,373,000) and FY 2004 ($5,267,000). According to the USAID/Nigeria FY 2004 Budget Justification, Nigeria uses its ESF monies to “fund anti-cor- ruption activities for civil society over- sight of national budget preparation and implementation, policy reform and advocacy” and “strengthen the capacity of local NGO networks and conflict resolution practitioners to mediate conflict as well as the capaci- ty of community groups to institute conflict avoidance and peace mainte- nance mechanisms.” Nigeria is an 80 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 The first program component, anti- corruption, was severely hampered by the Nigerian government’s move to repeal the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act.