The Foreign Service Journal, September 2005

penalties for violations are viewed as another obstacle by many FSOs. Nevertheless, there has been a bitter dispute between some AFSA members and the Gover- ning Board over its decision to accept the State Department’s position on internal security without first referring the issue to the AFSA membership in greater detail. In 2004, there was an effort to hold a referendum to call the board to account on this point, but the proposal did not generate sufficient support to meet the requirements set forth in the association’s bylaws for being formally presented. Central Casting. Likewise, there is continuing con- cern over naturalized citizens. While the overwhelming majority of naturalized citizens are loyal Americans (after all, they chose the United States rather than being citi- zens at birth), one study of espionage against the U.S. between 1947 and 2001 found that 17 percent of these spies were naturalized citizens. (For comparison, just 3.8 percent of the general population is naturalized, accord- ing to the 2000 census.) Indeed, the CIA has had a con- tinuing problem recruiting ethnic minorities of “hyphen- ated-American” background as significant numbers fail to pass the security clearance process. A former CIA officer has written that two-thirds of all applicants presented for clearance fail — primarily by not being able to pass poly- graph tests. Nevertheless, the old rules and shibboleths have been swept away. The Foreign Service of 2005 is “central casting:” that is, it more broadly reflects the ethnic-social-gen- der-racial composition of the United States than ever in the past. The current composition of the American Foreign Service illustrates the success of U.S. society — from Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell to your average “line” visa officer in Forgottenstan. This otherwise healthy development, however, places unparalleled demands on security clearances in circumstances where what was once regarded as “deviance” in regard to sexual mores, mar- riage and pre-employment drug use is now accepted as diversity and personal preference. The consequence has been an increasingly demand- ing and doubtlessly more intrusive security clearance process. Studies have suggested that individuals do not enter gov- ernment with the career objec- tive of becoming traitors; a vari- ety of post-entry career failures and personal factors turn them toward spying. Consequently, update background investiga- tions are more frequent; five years now is the standard inter- val between updates, rather than a vague indefinite “when they get around to it.” The questioning on every aspect of a candidate’s or an employee’s life is unprecedented in detail. Those who have not recently encountered the new background investigation will quickly appreciate that this is not the investigation of 10 or 20 years ago, with a relatively per- functory set of forms and no personal exchange with an investigator. For those married to the same spouse for 20 years, with their mortgage paid off and their drug of choice a medicinal evening glass of wine, the long series of questions concerning finances, mental health, sexual behavior, substance use, and criminal conduct may seem bizarre rather than threatening. But for those who might consider the quote, “When I was young and immature … I was young and immature” more descriptive than amusing, the security back- ground investigation is a new challenge. To be sure, one doesn’t have to answer an investigator’s questions; but neither is the department required to provide or renew a security clearance — it is a privilege, not a right. The questions asked of those provided as points of contact/recommendations are also often (although not consistently) extended and detailed. At a minimum, you are generally no longer simply asked whether you recommend “X” for “a position of trust.” Yet, unless an investigator obtains specific evidence that what has been presented is incorrect or deliberately incomplete, it is difficult to deny a clearance. In search of greater security certainty, the department may ultimately circle back to the question of employing “lie detectors.” The polygraph has been an issue of con- siderable drama for State. On Dec. 19, 1985, then- Secretary of State George P. Shultz announced during a press conference that, if asked, he would take a lie detec- tor test “once”— and then resign. He continued: “The F O C U S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 Even before the 9/11 attacks, the word was out: handling classified material was no longer a casual matter.