The Foreign Service Journal, September 2005

minute in this government that I am told that I’m not trusted is the day I leave.” Earlier in the press conference, Sec. Shultz had expressed “grave reserva- tions” over polygraph testing, commenting that “It’s hardly a scientific instrument. It tends to identify quite a few people who are innocent as guilty, and it misses at least some fraction of people who are guilty of lying.” For the ensuing 20 years, none of his successors has moved away from the Shultz ultimatum; however, State’s stance on poly- graph use is an internal policy position rather than a fed- eral regulation. While the technical shortcomings of “lie detectors” are widely recognized by professionals (Aldrich Ames and other spies repeatedly passed polygraph exams), their use at the CIA and in various sections of the FBI and other agencies has (at least potentially) opened the gate for their use at the State Department. Indeed, under specific circumstances (e.g., a liaison assignment at CIA), an FSO must pass the same polygraph exam given to a CIA employee. For all of its shortcomings, the polygraph would be a powerful tool in the “scared straight” security arsenal — notwithstanding the philo- sophical objections and its technical weaknesses. Eventually, the technical problems of the polygraph may be overcome as new experiments using a function- al magnetic resonance imaging machine demonstrate that distinctly different portions of the brain “light up” during a true statement than during a lie. Changing the Culture There can be little doubt that the Foreign Service has become significantly more security-conscious over the past few years. One reason for this increased awareness is the reality that the 9/11 attacks were a seminal event for the wave of new entrants hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. But the personnel of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security deserve most of the credit for this welcome development, achieved in large part by encouraging their colleagues to be part of the solution and by investing substantial time and money in security training. Still, a widespread perception lingers that the decision to increase personnel and physical security and, particularly, the inclusion of security records in the performance files presented to promotion panels, were polit- ically-driven moves that did not actually reflect any major gaps in State’s security practices. One major challenge comes in making the security infrac- tion system more survivable for substantive officers who all but drown in the daily flood of clas- sified information. Just as those who drive 100,000 miles per year are more likely to have accidents than those who drive 1,000, senior officials often will have infractions that those who deal almost exclusively with unclassified material will not. The same reality applies to officers working 14-hour days under difficult condi- tions overseas, as opposed to 9-5ers at Main State. A one-size-fits-all set of security regulations may be “just” but not “fair.” In short, no matter how stringent and well-funded a system is in place, there will always be security infrac- tions, some of which (luckily for the offenders!) will never be discovered. Indeed, the number of violations can just as reasonably be attributed to stepped-up enforcement as to laxity. If the objective really is to eliminate all security infractions, however minor, that cannot be done on the cheap. The department may need to devote more funds to constructing “vaulted” areas where classified material can be secured general- ly rather than individually. Likewise, technology now permits “secure” computer terminals: expanding this service would allow an officer to work from home rather than face the unenviable choice of spending another hour at the office or illegally taking classified material home to finish. However these balancing acts are ultimately cali- brated, we need to reach the point where security reg- ulations are regarded as “red lights” — where, even in the dead of night, a motorist will sit patiently waiting for the green — rather than as highway speed limits which are mainly observed in the breach. n F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 The use of lie detectors at the CIA and in various sections of the FBI and other agencies has (at least potentially) opened the gate for their use at the State Department.