The Foreign Service Journal, September 2005

62 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 F O C U S O N D I P L O M A T I C S E C U R I T Y L EFT IN L IMBO T WO F IRST -P ERSON A CCOUNTS OF P ROBLEMS WITH DS CASE 1: M ISTREATED BY M Y O WN O RGANIZATION A May 24, 2005, Washington Times article titled “Don’t Fault the Messenger” alleges that cer- tain U.S. government departments and agen- cies are using security clearances as weapons of retalia- tion without any fear of oversight. Based on my own unfortunate experience over the last two years, I must ask whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security falls into that category. Speaking as someone who has been a DS special agent for 18 years, I find my bureau’s con- duct and tactics to be reprehensible. My last overseas posting was a “critical threat” coun- try where allegations were made that I had an improp- er relationship with a Foreign Service National employee, a citizen of the host country, and subse- quently disobeyed explicit DS instructions to cease all contact with the foreign national. I have maintained that my relationship (which I reported as required by DS’s regulations) was not sexual, or otherwise improp- er, and that I was never directed to cease all contact with this foreign national, as DS is now claiming. The DS investigative record to date reveals that the bureau found no evidence that my relationship was sexu- al or improper. Nor does it cite any alerting counterin- telligence indicators regarding the FSN. Furthermore, while it has been DS’s practice to give written “cease and desist” orders to other employees and contractors, direct- ing them to cease all communications with certain for- eign nationals, I was never given such an order, a claim that DS does not contest. When presented with the DS report of investigation, the Department’s Office of Employee Relations found no grounds to discipline me for disobeying a DS direc- tive, violating contact reporting requirements, or any- thing else. In fact, the record further shows that I properly followed 12 FAM 261 guidelines and separate post security-notice guidelines regarding contact- reporting requirements. I know for a fact that DS has issued written “cease and desist” orders to other State Department generalists and specialists, including DS Editor’s Note: The Foreign Service Journal does not normally publish unsigned articles, but we are making an exception in this instance. The two authors — one a DS special agent, the other a communications officer — have had their security clearances suspended for more than two years now, with no end in sight. Both individ- uals are members and clients of AFSA. Both authors have made it clear that they are not asking that the articles appear anonymously because they wish to hide their identities from DS. In fact, they each give enough information about their cases that the bureau will have no difficulty in identifying them. (One has been quoted on the record in the Washington Post and on National Public Radio.) Rather, these two Foreign Service specialists are seeking to protect reputations and careers within the department, while still informing their colleagues of these troubling issues. In addition, Donald R. Reid, director of DS’s Security Infrastructure Program, and AFSA General Counsel Sharon Papp have each contributed commentaries on the security clearance revocation process. — Steven Alan Honley Editor