The Foreign Service Journal, September 2005

C ASE 2: K AFKA ’ S L EGACY I have been a federal employee for 29 years, 16 of them as a State Department communications officer. During my career, I have never received a single security infraction or violation — a perfect security record. So why am I writing? Because ever since February 2003, my Top Secret security clearance has been suspended and I have been without an assignment or duties. The events that led to a suspension of my clearance began in December 2002 with a tip that one of my post’s two Foreign Service National systems administrators “might have been providing information to a hostile intel- ligence service.” Despite critical understaffing of the communications unit, a chronic situation that persisted during my entire tour, I gave myself over entirely to the investigation. After several weeks of fruitless effort, it became apparent that the underlying premise for the investigation was flawed, but both FSNs were fired any- way — “just in case,” as the Regional Security Officer put it. At that point, the focus turned toward me, presumably to justify the efforts expended to date and to extend the “just in case” doctrine one step farther to me as the post communications officer. Following a brief, unannounced visit by a DS/ISI/CI (Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence) team, I was abruptly curtailed from post on Feb. 3, 2003, without a single consultation or debriefing. In a candid moment, the RSO revealed to me that the team leader from CI had labeled me a “liar” at a public function and had then busied himself attempting to prove it, going so far as to photograph dozens of light- ning rods around the embassy that he proclaimed to be “illegal radio antennas” that I had installed. Yet the only advice the RSO could give me regarding CI’s tactics was that I “should sue them.” Guilty of Assignment I was finally allowed to review a memorandum from CI and DS’s Office of Professional Responsibility almost two years after my curtailment from post. Hastily draft- ed after the CI team’s departure, it provided the sole jus- tification for my curtailment and the suspension of my security clearance, largely by citing unsubstantiated charges and bizarre allegations that might otherwise have been readily dismissed — had I been provided with a few moments to discuss them while still at post. CI “discovered” I had been posted to three newly- independent states, “all within the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union, from 1993 to present.” No mat- ter how implausible the concept, CI had evidently deduced that my present and former assignments alone constituted a threat to the security of the United States government. In a manner that would have made Senator McCarthy proud, I had been, unbeknownst to me, branded “a communist sympathizer.” CI also cited my travel to a “critical HUMINT threat country” as a violation of regulations concerning travel and contact reporting. In vain I have pointed out that the RSO did not provide me with a security briefing or advi- sory at any time during my four-plus years at post, con- trary to requirements in the Foreign Affairs Manual and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. In fact, none of my colleagues were briefed during that period. As a result many post staffers, including the RSO himself, had unwittingly traveled to critical-threat posts and countries, usually on weekend shopping trips, without having pro- vided the required notification. In preparation for my January 2003 trip to the same country my colleagues (including the RSO) had visited before without incident, I compared notes with the RSO several weeks before I departed concerning my plans, travel dates and the hotel where I would be staying. I found out years later (once I was allowed access to my security file) that CI also knew of my planned travel at least two full days before my departure. Yet despite an active dialogue between the CI and the RSO during this time frame, none of the security officers involved pre- vented my travel, raised alarms or advised me of any security risks or advance reporting requirements. Reporting Contacts — Too Little Information, Too Late … In support of a subsequent proposal to revoke my secu- rity clearance, DS also cited my alleged violation of report- ing provisions concerning my relationship with two foreign nationals. DS stated my conduct could render me vulner- able to exploitation by foreign governments, particularly since I was legally still married at the time. Simple research determined that there was no requirement to file a contact report on one of the foreign nationals and I point- ed out to DS that I had, in fact, filed a report concerning the second one, immediately after I met her in person. (I F O C U S 66 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5