The Foreign Service Journal, September 2006

ple to learn more English. Just as important, in his view, was the process of building U.N. bases outside of the cap- ital, which had enabled his firm to expand and hire peo- ple in the economically depressed regions. This is a critical point. Whether the UNPKOs con- tribute to much-needed decentralization (as opposed to simply furthering the tendency to concentrate economic benefits and political power in the center) can have important consequences for economic development, as well as the settlement of political conflict. Cote d’Ivoire is a good example. Given the relatively large size of the economy compared to most other PKO countries, U.N. mission spending, mostly in the capital, had little effect on the country’s overall economy. But it did exert a more potent influence in neglected regions outside the capital, where threats to the country’s prospects for reunifying were most serious. And, as at other missions, the rela- tively small ($1 million per mission) budget for PKO- managed Quick Impact Projects achieved disproportion- ate results. The QIP programs give missions the ability to target projects to areas most key to overall mission objec- tives, and they were referred to in positive terms every- where I visited. PKF Catering and Local Agriculture One of the largest economic activities at every mission is the catering contract for the PKF troops. Given the scale of these operations and the stringent U.N. quality- control requirements, it did not seem feasible in most of these countries for any local enterprise to handle such a contract. It was encouraging, however, to find that, for the most part, experienced on-the-ground managers for the major catering contractors had a strong interest in increasing local procurement and local hiring. In most cases there were obvious financial and practical benefits. In Burundi, the PKF catering operation was the largest economic enterprise in the country. Faced with the requirement of trucking imported supplies at least 1,600 kilometers overland from East African ports, its innovative manager worked with local farmers to the max- imum extent possible to procure eggs, fruits and vegeta- bles. Finding inadequate supplies of bread and baked goods locally, this manager established his own bakery, creating a number of additional local jobs and producing what were probably the only authentic bagels in Central Africa. In the DRC, the international manager of the catering operations located an NGO project in the eastern part of the country that was training some 500 blind people to do gardening. Arrangements were made, in cooperation with international agricultural specialists in the area who were in a position to maintain quality control, for these blind gardeners to sell their excess production to the catering firm. This was an inspiring example of what could be done to improve the U.N.’s economic impact, but it was carried out solely on the local manager’s per- sonal initiative. With active encouragement from above and systematic efforts to coordinate NGO projects and UNPKO needs, there is little doubt that much more could be achieved. Mission Officials: Divergent Approaches Working in any aspect of a peacekeeping operation is a tough job. These are, after all, some of the most diffi- cult logistical environments found anywhere. Senior mis- sion managers face additional challenges that include unclear mandate lengths, inadequate lead times for the startup of missions, contradictory directives and med- dling from member states (who sometimes press for lower expenditure and more efficiency, while simultane- ously seeking to ensure that their own companies bene- fit). In addition, the U.N. bureaucracy has evolved vol- umes of sometimes confusing and often overly rigid reg- ulations. It was not surprising, therefore, that some PKO senior managers, who had developed their own time-test- ed ways of navigating through such obstacles, did not react with enthusiasm to suggestions that they change their approach. While most special representatives of the secretary- general and their deputies favored maximizing the involvement of local contractors and personnel, their views did not always take hold. At one mission, after hearing the special representative state that the policy was to purchase everything possible on the local econo- my, I met with the chief of procurement. He began by noting that he had been forced to buy a few small items locally to meet urgent needs, but he wanted to provide assurances that otherwise he got everything possible from outside sources. This officer was not unique in reflecting what he saw as strong encouragement from New York to procure as much as possible within the confines of the big systems contracts. Complex procurement rules provide convenient pre- texts for officials who find it easier to deal with the more F O C U S 50 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 6