The Foreign Service Journal, September 2007

taken by a government to defeat insurgency,” as the new doctrine defines it. The goal would be to make states strong enough to police internal vio- lence pursuant to their domestic laws. A state stabilization strategy would help contain violent extrem- ism locally, eliminate terrorist safe havens, and disrupt the global networks that are force multipliers of terrorism. Thus the new counterinsurgency doctrine is, in turn, central to a broader national security strategy. Building a consensus about U.S. security strategy — not simply its goals, but the way we will achieve them — is particularly vital at this political moment. The endgame in Iraq risks pushing Americans toward policy extremes, just as Vietnam produced a backlash on both the left and right. But today, neither unconstrained and exclusive use of military power abroad, nor a retreat to isolationism and homeland defense, is the answer to the global terrorist challenge. Neither approach can make Americans safer while representing our values in an ideological struggle. The new counterinsurgency manual offers an alternative, more productive approach. Fighting “Right:” Field Manual 3-24 A counterinsurgency effort, as the military doctrine explains, is primarily political. It requires civilian direction and participation to achieve political effects. The armed forces play a critical, but supporting, role in operations that also include economic, social, informational and polit- ical initiatives. Indeed, the need for military power de- creases as the counterinsurgents make progress against their insurgent enemies. This dance of nonmilitary and military efforts in pursuit of political aims requires plan- ning, resources and choreography. Participants therefore need an overarching policy that defines the purposes of counterinsurgency, clarifies U.S. government assumptions about the effort, and articulates the demands and expectations of each participant. The supporting military doctrine, like that from every other participant in the effort, should flow from that national policy. At present, the U.S. has it backward. There is no national counterinsurgency policy. And, stuck with the hot potatoes of Afghanistan and Iraq, military authorities sought to fill the vacuum with a new field manual. In light of the U.S. military’s glori- fication of firepower and force pro- tection, Field Manual 3-24 may come to be seen as a watershed. The new doctrine flatly rejects the notion that brute force succeeds and argues for a more humane approach, one that ensures the physical security of civilians and Geneva Convention protections for prisoners. It dictates that soldiers and Marines must assume greater risk on behalf of civilians. It commits the U.S. military to fighting pursuant to the laws of war, even when the enemy does not. The doctrine recognizes that only by rejecting the foe’s terrorist tactics can the U.S. claim the moral high ground. It is certainly true that the avowed enemies of America don’t care how cleanly we fight; in fact, their strategy is to provoke U.S. excess and fulfill Samuel Huntington’s prophesied “clash of civilizations.” But the center of grav- ity today is the unconvinced moderate middle —whether among the indigenous population, Muslims, allies or Americans. Courting these audiences requires sustaining a commitment — however imperfect in practice — to moral warfare. Here the distinction between combatant and noncom- batant is critical. Physical security is a core human right, and civilian protection is a central precept of internation- al law. Without it, we have no claim to outrage against ter- ror. Nor can we win a struggle against violent radicals if moderate Muslims perceive our actions as indistinguish- able from the terrorists’ acts. Failure to underscore this distinction — through its choices of wars and targets, overweening reliance on military power, and ineffective nationbuilding — has been a signal U.S. failure in the ide- ological struggle against terrorism. Yet while the administration gambles away civil liber- ties at home and abandons human rights abroad, the U.S. military has recommitted itself to protecting the rights of foreign citizens of all nationalities and faiths. Certainly this is only what international law requires. But who can take such norms for granted these days? Precisely because it runs counter to the administration’s overall no- holds-barred, destroy-the-village-to-save-it approach to counterterrorism, the doctrine is radical and its future is uncertain. Thus, the new approach needs tending and support by civilians to make sure it is implemented. This will require F O C U S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35 Civil servants are understandably wary of being pressed into the service of “more Iraqs.”