The Foreign Service Journal, September 2007

support from above (through policy and politics in Washington) and from below or alongside (through expanded capacity and partners in the field). The mili- tary’s success ultimately will depend upon whether or not the civilian foreign affairs and national security communi- ties define a congruent national counterinsurgency policy, identify their stake in its success, and help to shape and define it. Needed: A National Policy There are many urgent policy questions that military doctrine alone simply cannot address. The single most important of these is whether or not counterinsurgency will be used to support a revolutionary grand strategy — namely, destroying or transforming states. Such a purpose would contort counterinsurgency’s very nature. As a method for stabilizing governments by enhancing their legitimacy, counterinsurgency is self-evidently not suited to destroying and replacing existing political systems. This unanswered question should be the core of a broader debate about U.S. national security strategy. Given recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is understandable that the bureaucracy and public suspect that better counterinsurgency tools will be used offen- sively against governments, rather than defensively to support or mend them. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” initiative, too, seems to beg this question. Indeed, the prospect that coun- terinsurgency concepts and capabilities would be dedi- cated to regime change is sufficiently controversial, both conceptually and politically, that it impedes efforts to improve U.S. practice. Before civilians build counterin- surgency capability, they want to know what it is for. A national policy should tackle this larger issue head- on, delineating the purposes underlying it and identifying circumstances in which the principles underlying it are most likely to succeed. The policy should also provide guidelines regarding the character of U.S. nationbuilding. Certainly if the goal is to support the host nation — instead of redesigning it in America’s image — the local government’s own values and choices should guide U.S. activities. The urgent need to achieve stability may force com- promises in other areas. A counterinsurgency policy should force U.S. agencies to revisit their usual ways of doing business in the political, economic and social spheres. Everything from accounting procedures and legal authorities to the substantive goals underlying nationbuilding programs may need rethinking. The Speaking Out column in the June FSJ noted USAID’s reluctance to support Afghan government programs to create “model schools,” efforts the U.S. military backs to undermine the radical Islamic religious schools (madras- sas). But the government schools would also have reli- gious content, and USAID is wary of funding them in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause. Such sensibilities may be an unaffordable luxury when concern about insurgent violence is paramount. Likewise, U.S. agencies may need to abandon tradi- tional political orthodoxies. Early elections, for example, can be destabilizing and divisive. Privatization can dis- rupt services and cause social and economic dislocation. Four years into the Iraq War, the State and Defense Departments and the military and embassy in the field are still bickering about economic policy, the relation- ship of security to political reform, and the relative power of military and civilian officials. We have seen how tensions within the U.S. government — often between the military and civilian agencies — can pre- vent a coherent and unified counterinsurgency effort. A national policy should provide guidance that can mini- mize such enervating disputes. There are more problematic normative issues — ulti- mately human rights questions — for a national coun- terinsurgency policy to consider. What should the United States do when indigenous programs or policies run counter to U.S. standards? Field Manual 3-24 accepts, in the words of T.E. Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia), that it is better for the locals to do something tolerably well than for the counterinsurgent to do it for them. At what point, though, is the locals’ behavior no longer toler- able? Will the line be drawn at local violations or when violations are national policy? When do the consequences of withdrawing U.S. support risk greater rights violations? These are among the toughest questions in counterin- surgency, and civilians must take responsibility for grap- pling with them. A national policy should articulate the problem and offer guidelines for navigating these sensi- tive differences between local human rights standards and international or U.S. expectations. Left to their own devices without policy guidance, mil- itary forces must muddle through these issues. Generally this entails defaulting to the most direct, and often short- term, route to stability — working with the local power F O C U S 36 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 7