The Foreign Service Journal, September 2007

ing during a conflict? The Secretary of State had to ask DOD to fill the civilian billets on Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Was this the result of a lack of eligible professionals, the politics of the Iraq War, or a broader disinclination, however sound, to assume physical risk? The State Department’s reluctant edging toward directed assignments adumbrates the larger challenge. Terrorism has already made serving abroad a much high- er-risk proposition; counterinsurgency only expands the risks for civilians. It provides little comfort to non-com- batants that the new Field Manual also demands more risk from soldiers. The Foreign Service has a great tradi- tion of brave service in conflict zones. Yet if it cannot meet needs in the field, it risks irrelevance to the policies that matter most. If it stands aloof, it may come to regret ceding counterinsurgency to the military or watching the emergence of an expeditionary civilian capacity that cre- ates policy through its actions on the ground. Another aspect of enhancing civilian leadership is cre- ating a new — or, arguably, reviving an older — breed of Foreign Service officer, one steeped in military culture and familiar with the possibilities and limits of military power. Professional specialization and broader trends in civil-military affairs have divorced civilians from their uni- formed counterparts. The military’s size and commit- ment to education have allowed its officer corps to become far more conversant with civilian institutions and culture than vice versa. Civilian agencies must address this deficit. Thanks to two long-running wars, the nub of such a cadre is beginning to emerge. But there are few institu- tional processes for recognizing, nurturing and judicious- ly employing these pol-mil hybrids. Finally, the fact that civilian authorities have not been fully honest about the limits of their capacity is a lingering problem. They have sometimes masked their shortfalls with critiques of the military’s operational overreach and its failure to provide them with security. They have insist- ed upon retaining prerogatives even when they cannot carry out the corollary work. Perhaps the executive agency bureaucracies fear that the truth will render them irrelevant to policymaking. But perpetuating the myth of civilian partnership enables decisionmakers to eschew responsibility for building civil- ian capacity. Brutal honesty may be the only way to cat- alyze change. Still, civilians won’t be able to convince any- one to make the changes and finance the huge investment required unless counterinsurgency fits into a compelling national security strategy. Interagency Process Stalled In September 2006, the State Department (with co- sponsorship from the Defense Department) hosted a con- ference on “Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a National Framework.” It brought together a who’s who of players in U.S. counterinsurgency. Using the newly completed military doctrine as a springboard, the conveners sought to create a national counterinsurgency center and a plan for developing policy. Interagency processes are difficult enough when most participants agree on the general goal but disagree about the way to accomplish it. The counterinsurgency policy effort appeared to lack consensus on both fronts. From the start, there was confusion about its purposes. Is this policy intended to guide more large-scale invasions such as Iraq, or small-scale efforts with friendly governments like the Philippines? Is it a complement to counterterror- ism strategy or its replacement? Participants were also unsure how their agencies fit into the policy. USAID officials claim a role in develop- ment and conflict prevention; S/CRS describes its focus as stability operations; other departments and agencies, such as Treasury and Agriculture, are comfortable contributing to nationbuilding. But counterinsurgency? One can imagine officials asking themselves: How is this different from what my agency already does? Will it require us to change? These distinctions are more than semantic, reflecting assumptions about legitimacy, partners, resources and levels of violence. Moreover, they have yet to be answered. Much of this dysfunction is familiar to any veteran of government. In the Lake Wobegon interagency process, everyone is more important than average. The key issue is who’s in charge, not what they should do. More energy is spent explaining whose efforts are fundamental than how they will be carried out. Competencies are cataloged, not assessed. No shortfalls are identified. The orientation is procedural (this is how we will plan), not substantive (these are our operating principles). The same stovepipes that contribute to dysfunction in the field are replicated in the policy process. The policy review faces other challenges. Administra- tion officials are preoccupied with the actual conduct of F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 7