The Foreign Service Journal, September 2007

protect the rights of both groups. The agreement urged all parties to use their influence to encourage the decommissioning of the paramilitary arms that have bedeviled politics in the region for a long time. Our group, the Independent International Com- mission on Decommissioning, was created to facilitate this task. As the political talks between the two gov- ernments and the various political parties of Northern Ireland began to mature, we were able to begin face- to-face negotiations with a team from the Irish Republican Army. Building trust took patience and time, but in late 2001 we saw an initial amount of the group’s weapons put beyond use. Further quantities of arms were decommissioned in 2002 and 2003. Then, in September 2005, my two colleagues and I witnessed the disposal of the last of the IRA’s sub- stantial arsenal. None of the parties to the conflict disputed our statement that Republican weapons had been taken out of Irish politics at last. Of course, the burden of negotiat- ing details of this complex agreement and creating a political package acceptable to both the nationalist and unionist communities fell to the British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland’s political parties. Despite a genuine commitment by political and civic leaders, progress toward standing up a power-sharing government on a permanent footing, as with the decommissioning of arms, was often slow and hesitant. Too often it seemed that we would never see devolved government based on support from both communities, or paramilitary weapons really removed from circulation. Today, though, both these goals have been substantially accomplish- ed. While the political history of the “Troubles” has been described in many books (and there are surely more to come), some lessons from Northern Ireland’s experience that I believe are broadly relevant to other ethnic and sectarian conflicts follow here. Patience is critical. Ten years may seem like a long time to pursue negotiations, but it is quite brief in the context of a conflict that dates back many generations. Military might is not enough. People often say they badly want peace but, of course, not at any price. Sure! But what does that mean? Each side may be certain it will not be defeated, but objective viewers can see that neither will be able to win. “Unleashing the security ser- vices,” as some participants in these conflicts frequently demand, is not likely to erase the other side’s sense of grievance or refute its arguments. Nor will that tactic dismantle the opposition’s organization and infra- structure once and for all — at least not at a price that most societies can accept today. Negotiations do not have to be a zero-sum game. Frequently in these conflicts there will be two win- ners, or no winner; peace, or endless stalemate with continuing hatred and violence. Sectarian behavior, dis- crimination in word and deed, and the unequal application of the rule of law are not constructive practices, no matter how time-honored they may be. In Northern Ireland the process of nurturing this understanding was called “decommissioning mind-sets.” It takes courage and vision on the part of political and civic leaders on both sides. Each side must recognize that its opponent has rights. In Northern Ireland, this attitude is called “parity of esteem.” I think it boils down to simple good manners. No matter how much you detest the other group’s ideas, leaders and prac- tices, demonizing people or their cul- ture isn’t constructive in the long run. It is useful to bear in mind that just a few years ago, republican leaders in Northern Ireland were publicly labeled “terrorists.” Yet British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently hailed those same figures in Parliament as “statesmen.” It is not productive in an eth- nic or sectarian conflict to expect that either side will admit to wrongdoing. “Acts of completion” (sitting down in government to share in making public policy, decommis- sioning weapons and standing down paramilitary organizations, etc.) are essential. But acts of contrition (aton- ing for one’s history) are likely to be impossible, and demands for them will only stall the peace process. As a distinguished panel of international advisers headed by former Senator George Mitchell told the British and Irish governments in 1995, peace is unlikely unless both sides accept that there will be “no surrender and no defeat.” Face-to-face negotiations are essential at an early stage. Such interactions demonstrate to both con- stituencies that their grievances can be addressed and political objectives can be achieved through the democ- ratic process. Participants should spell out what they need to end the conflict and follow through when they 54 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 7 Ten years may seem like a long time to pursue negotiations, but it is quite brief in the context of a conflict that dates back many generations.