The Foreign Service Journal, September 2008

other political priorities. It is the attempt to substitute U.S.-defined strategic interests for recipient-need assessments in the identification of development priorities. No degree of precision in the application of metrics can produce an equation comparing the health or education priorities of beneficiaries with U.S. interests in cre- ating stable democracies or interdict- ing the flow of narcotics. Advocates for foreign assistance reform seek more effective targeting of aid policies to development objec- tives, not simply civilian control over U.S. foreign policy. Given the funda- mental divergence between the stated goal of the F process — to achieve strategic coherence in State Depart- ment planning — and the goal sought by advocates of foreign assistance reform— to improve aid effectiveness — it is futile to simply build upon the current structure, particularly given how discredited the process has become both inside and outside gov- ernment. Adams himself points out the many flaws in F’s implementation. But one cannot simply chalk up the shortcomings to poor implementa- tion and communication. The next administration could pursue a more limited approach, involving a fine- tuning of the process following its own after-action review. But to do so would be a grave mistake. Greater refinement of indicators will not solve the problems of an antiquated for- eign assistance structure. Compre- hensive reform requires conversa- tions with all key players, including Congress and other executive branch agencies engaged in foreign assis- tance programs. A primary concern of the develop- ment community has been ensuring a clear separation between develop- ment and political priorities. The F process conflates development and political assistance (e.g., the Economic Support Fund), ignoring their distinct legislative backgrounds and objectives. The HELP Commission has recom- mended that these priorities be clearly differentiated, and that development programs be “ring-fenced” to insulate them from misappropriation and mis- use. At the end of the day, as Adams notes, the F process sank into irrele- vance as Congress largely ignored the administration’s Fiscal Year 2008 bud- get request, instead approving a final budget reflecting its own priorities. Needed: A Grand Dialogue While sympathetic to the concerns of the development community and wary of the increased role of the Defense Department, Prof. Adams gives short shrift to the evolution of the development profession. Instead, he seems to equate the roles of diplomacy and development. He views the emer- gence of USAID as an afterthought, a “strange hybrid” that resulted from the State Department’s intrinsic institu- tional culture, which rendered it inca- pable of performing strategic resource planning, programdesign and program implementation. Adams acknowledges the existence of different corporate cultures at USAID and State, but doesn’t appear to grasp the essence of it: USAID is first and foremost an implementation organization; State is an analysis, reporting and negotiating organiza- tion. These are not interchangeable skill sets. The solution to the challenges in foreign assistance is not simply refin- ing the F process, or having State department personnel take courses in organizational behavior and planning. Adams’ faith in the ability of career diplomats to assume this mission underestimates the complexity of development and the significance of the contributions of USAID profes- sionals and civil-society groups. Furthermore, asking the State De- partment to assume the implementa- tion mission potentially distracts that agency from pursuing the analysis and negotiating missions that are equally vital to America’s foreign policy suc- cess. The development community can applaud some of the early achieve- ments of the F process: improved transparency in planning and budget- ing, and recognition that, in the greater scheme of things, these pro- grams are all instruments of “smart power” that project U.S. influence as a force for stability and security. But having done so, we must move on to consider more ambitious challenges, many of which other reports have raised. These studies outline the need for a grand dialogue, which might involve discussion of some of the following issues: • Accounting for other core drivers of development, beyond foreign assis- tance, such as fiscal and trade policies, private capital flows, remittances, cor- porate and foundation philanthropy, and regional integration; • Professionalizing development staff, including strengthening USAID by rebuilding technical capability; • Establishing crisis funds (human- itarian, conflict) to introduce a needed dose of reality and stability to foreign assistance funding; • Achieving greater transparency of 54 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 A primary concern of the development community has been ensuring a clear separation between development and political priorities.