The Foreign Service Journal, September 2008

S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 57 Office of Information Programs and Services is the baseline point of contact for anyone seeking access to department records. That office has divisions for programs and policies; requestor liaison; statutory compliance and research; and archiving and access systems management, as well as the State Department’s Ralph Bunche Library. The office also stays current with changes in the law and in policy. It handles ongoing, systematic declassification of documents and responds to public requests under the terms of the FOIA. The office also stays current with changes in policy and procedure for declassification activities mandated by successive executive orders. The latest such order, E.O. 13392, issued on Dec. 14, 2005, directed the designation of a chief FOIA officer in each Cabinet agency at the assistant secretary level, among other things. The department adroitly dual-hatted the A Bureau’s assistant secretary in this capacity. The assistant secretary is also officially the FOIA ombudsman, although in practical terms the authority is delegated to sub- ordinates. Pursuant to this order, State also cre- ated an FOIA Requester Service Center (known as the Advocacy and Oversight Branch) to provide status reports on requests and a public liaison to handle concerns about the service requesters receive. Thus far, it has received only bouquets from users and nary a brickbat, according to Service Center officials. Complaints, they say, generally con- cern points over which the center has no control, such as how much material may be redacted. Alongside the FOIA process, the department conducts ongoing, systematic declassification. As even the most secu- rity-obsessed will admit, at some point, official information no longer requires protection — whether or not anyone requests it. At its lowest level — as a handling restriction rather than a security classification — the designation of “Limited Official Use” (now superseded by “Sensitive but Unclassified”) is designed to give protection to information for a limited period. Such designations are accorded, for example, to travel arrangements by senior officials or confer- ence programs, then removed when the travel or meeting is completed. Other material, ranked by level of classification (Confidential, Secret or Top Secret) and handling restric- tions (Limited Distribution, Exclusive Distribution or No Distribution), requires longer periods before it can be released to the public. Such material is protected often for years, sometimes for decades. Indeed, there is material, such as that associated with nuclear weapons, that has no foreseeable date when it can be released to the public. Material obtained through electronic intercept, code decryption or satellite photography is also subject to extend- ed delays prior to release. Likewise, the names of specific individuals who provided information, either to diplomats or clandestine agents, might need to be protected indefinitely, even after their death. After all, repercussions from their association with the United States could fall on surviving family members, who may themselves be in a comparably cozy relationship with U.S. officials given that politics is a multigenerational family business in many societies. Alternatively, the revelation that a senior national leader was also an intelli- gence source for the U.S. government could harm our bilateral relations even if such an association ended decades ago. Arguably, we are now in a period when any relationship with the U.S. other than the most mundane — even deep in the past — has ramifications that need attentive consideration prior to revelation. Expediting Declassification Nevertheless, long-extended protec- tion is the exception rather than the norm, and specific timeframes for the duration of classification have been built into initial classifi- cation since 1995. E.O. 12958 directed that the maximum period for classification should normally not exceed 10 years. It also ordered agencies to declassify all documents after 25 years, unless they fall into one of the nine categories of exemption specified in the order. The order further man- dated government agencies to establish and conduct a pro- gram for systematic declassification review for all records less than 25 years old that are of permanent historical value. There are exceptions for topics such as U.S. military plans, clandestine operations, “weapons of mass destruction” development or use, and U.S. foreign relations. Such mate- rial is not automatically declassified, but requires consulta- tion with the “original classification authority” before any determination. The order also sought to expedite systematic declassifica- tion, aiming to declassify all material over 25 years of age by 2000. At State, there were many delays, and the effort was repeatedly postponed. Some of the delays were the obvious consequence of limited funding for the experts necessary to declassify the material. The deadline was extended to 2006, allowing officials to complete the review of all documents in Even the most security- obsessed will admit that eventually official information no longer requires protection.