The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

16 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 Lessons Not Learned Ultimately, the intensive effort to keep Middle East peace process plan- ning and activities secret — not only from the media and Congress, but also from other agencies, the State Depart- ment’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and regional embassies—was feckless. There were constant leaks, often from foreign government sources; the expe- rience was akin to having a bucket with a tight lid and a dozen holes in the bot- tom. Meanwhile, the restrictions gener- ated hostility between those few “in the know” and their colleagues. Even the most senior State Department fig- ures addressing Middle East issues, let alone ambassadors in regional capitals, complained that they were systemati- cally cut out of the talks. Egregiously, the most senior career diplomat at State, Under Secretary for Political Af- fairs Thomas Pickering — an individ- ual with substantial experience in the Middle East —was totally uninvolved in the peace process, even though he was present in the department throughout the 1999 to 2001 time- frame. The tightly knit nature of the MEPP team meant that it became overextended. While it would, on oc- casion, reach out for specialized assis- tance (e.g., to the office of the Legal Adviser or intelligence officials for maps and territorial estimates), it lacked the depth to do generic studies on many special issues. There is also reason to believe that the excessive se- crecy kept team members from ap- preciating identifiable problems that later blindsided them. And as the Clinton administration sputtered to a close, the team slowly dissipated, leav- ing little residual expertise — and that largely untapped. George W. Bush’s administration performed no better, though it repeat- edly proclaimed its intention to ap- proach the region differently. Yet during its eight years in office, it did not engage there (diplomatically, at least) with anything approaching the intensity of its predecessor. And its much-touted “road map” for Middle East progress proved the diplomatic equivalent of the Alaskan bridge to nowhere. To the extent that it did engage, Washington continued its highly secre- tive, keep-no-records approach. For example, one of our ambassadors ap- parently went alone to meetings with Israelis — and never briefed senior embassy officials on his exchanges. And during the recent round of Gaza fighting, State mounted a desperate (and unsuccessful) effort to find some- one who knew details of earlier con- flicts, because no records were readily available. The rationale for this approach is twofold: a fear of leaks in politicized cir- cumstances and a desire to honor re- quests, often from foreign government officials, that no records be kept. Yet even if our negotiators are blessed with total recall, such skills are not transfer- able to a new negotiating team; brain implants are still science fiction, after all. And giving in to the desire for de- niability only puts Washington at a se- vere disadvantage compared to those parties that did keep records, forcing us to relearn where the alligators are in the swamp by being bitten again. Improving the Odds of Success Fortunately, history need not be destiny. The call for change that Barack Obama so effectively issued through- out the campaign should be the hall- mark of Middle East envoy George Mitchell and his entire team, and car- ried out in the following areas. Keep complete records. Accurate, comprehensive, timely reporting should follow every negotiating exchange. Yes, U.S. policymakers should classify and restrict such information as necessary; but they still need a comprehensive diplomatic record. After all, we can be sure that the other parties have one; so why should we stumble about myopi- cally? And even if American brilliance fails to illuminate a solution, at least the next negotiators will know where light has been previously directed. Make the Middle East peace process team an integral part of NEA. This is even more important when the top U.S. negotiators choose not to maintain a direct pipeline to senior de- partment officials. The team should also have a dedicated technical sup- port unit drawn from across the intel- ligence community to offer advice and trend analyses of issues relevant to the negotiations (e.g., public attitudes, do- mestic politics, etc.) Involve Congress in the process early. As a former Senate majority leader, George Mitchell could set up a S P E A K I N G O U T The most egregious gap we found was a complete absence of official records from the historic July 2000 Camp David Summit.