The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

The recent proliferation of arti- cles and monographs on this subject in military publications suggests that the Defense Department’s playbook overflows with tactical, operational and strategic guidance on how to wage counterinsurgency warfare. No such wealth of doctrine and counsel exists for DOD’s civilian counterparts, however. This is sur- prising, precisely because primary responsibility for achieving political progress in a coun- terinsurgency rests on civilian shoulders. The purpose of this article is to help fill this gap. In proposing a set of guiding principles, I confront a funda- mental dilemma for the diplomat-counterinsurgent: far outnumbered by the military in the field, lacking adequate amounts of program funds, and dependent upon col- leagues in uniform for such basics as mobility and security, how does a diplomat effectively pursue the political track, long seen as the decisive component of a counterinsur- gency? Create a Strategic Narrative The diplomat’s starting point is to craft a strategic nar- rative; that is, a compelling storyline that is the foundation of all actions taken in pursuit of the strategy. Such a nar- rative will be short and culturally unassailable. It will ex- plain the purpose of all government plans and programs, and will be used to interpret events throughout a coun- terinsurgency. The narrative will appeal directly to the local popula- tion. While the emphasis and application may differ ac- cording to local circumstances, there will be only one approach governing the broader counterin- surgency campaign. A strategic narrative for Afghani- stan, for example, might read as fol- lows: U.S. forces came to Afghanistan to evict foreign extremists and help restore the Afghan way of life. Their goal is to help the Afghan people make their country secure, economically self-sufficient and free from interference by external powers. They will re- main in Afghanistan as long as the Afghan people welcome them, and no longer. On the basis of the strategic narrative, the diplomat should draw up a political strategy detailing the various po- litical, military and development actions that will help the central government secure, and maintain, the support of the population. This plan should contain long-term ob- jectives, underlying assumptions and specific measures needed to achieve the objectives. It should be developed in close coordination with the U.S. military, development and intelligence agencies, non- governmental organizations, the host government and multinational partners. Any political strategy lacking the contributions and support of key stakeholders is doomed to failure. The strategy should be integrated and comprehensive. That is, it should utilize all available tools of power — local, national and international; military, political, economic and informational — to achieve its ends. It should identify ob- jectives at the village, district and provincial levels. Ob- jectives and actions should be placed against a timeline. Measurements of performance should be defined. Peri- odic reviews of performance should be conducted and the strategy recalibrated accordingly. Develop a Political Strategy to Win Local Support This will likely necessitate a systematic analysis, down to the village level, of a host of issues, including the following: What are the local power structures and on what basis (e.g., tribal, ethnic) are they organized? Which groups within the population are supportive of the government? Which groups are supportive of (or, more likely, are un- able to challenge) the insurgents? What political, eco- 22 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 F O C U S Improving the security of the local population and winning its support for the central government is — at its core — a political process. Kurt Amend, a Foreign Service officer since 1988, has been the consul general in Moscow since June 2007. Previous overseas assignments include Afghanistan, India, Kosovo, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan. In Washington, he has served in the Department of State Operations Center and on the staffs of the Secretary of Defense and the Na- tional Security Council. The views expressed herein are his alone and do not reflect Department of State or U.S. government policy. This article was adapted from “Counterinsurgency Prin- ciples for the Diplomat,” which appeared on July 19, 2008, in Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/ docs-temp/75-amend.pdf), and is used with permission.