The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23 nomic or security activities are likely to shift support of “the favorable mi- nority” of the local population to the government’s side? How can con- tested areas be made secure? Within the various tiers of leader- ship, who are the fence sitters, and how can they be won over? Who are the spoilers, and what incentives and disincentives can marginalize them? The diplomat should begin to assemble the principal components of a political strategy while preparing to as- sume his or her new responsibilities. Once in the field, diplomats should consult extensively with fellow coun- terinsurgents, move as briskly as possible through the an- alytical process suggested above, and fill out the strategy in light of ground realities. In areas where security is not the paramount issue — for example, in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley, where a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was established in 2005 — military operations will likely be de-emphasized in the po- litical strategy. Conversely, where security is a principal concern — Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province, for example — the com- bination of military, political and de- velopmental actions will look quite different. If a political strategy already exists, the diplomat — upon arrival and with the benefit of fresh insight — should reappraise the plan. Is there a forceful, underlying narra- tive? Are the working assumptions still valid? Do the guiding principles need to be revisited? Should effort be redirected to reflect a change in resources or the emer- gence of new challenges? Is performance being accurately measured, and what do the results indicate? Perhaps most important of all, the diplomat should work to ensure that every activity of every participant in a counterinsurgency — military, diplomatic, development, F O C U S No action should be undertaken unless it supports the counterinsurgency’s overarching political goals.