The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 intelligence, NGO, host government — is in some way linked to achieving political progress. In other words, no action should be undertaken in a counterinsurgency if it does not somehow support the campaign’s overarching political goals. For the diplomat, this is the heart of the matter. In Afghanistan back in 2004, for example, U.S. government-funded alternative livelihood programs for poppy farmers employed expatriate consultants in cer- tain southern provinces. Episodic attacks by insurgent groups forced the consultants to return to Kabul where they would remain, still under contract and earning per diem, until conditions in the provinces improved. While the security concerns were real, the negative political im- plications of this yo-yo-like movement of foreign advisers — as a result of which program funds covered restaurant and hotel bills rather than activities to help Afghan farm- ers develop licit sources of revenue — were profound. Similarly, combat operations that inadvertently alienate the local population should be viewed through the prism of the political strategy. If operations do not contribute to the security of the population, they should be reconsid- ered. This is, to be sure, easier said than done. Bureau- cratic lanes tend to be sharply demarcated. It is difficult to imagine any military commander responding warmly to perceived civilian intrusions into his operational planning process. And intelligence officers, nurtured in a need-to- know environment, may reflexively conclude that the diplomat indeed has no need to know. So it is incumbent upon the diplomat to ensure that military and civilian colleagues understand his or her mo- tives and the broader goals of the political strategy. By stressing the strategic narrative that informs the political action plan, and through a process of close collaboration, fellow counterinsurgents should see the desirability of aligning their activities with the campaign’s political goals. The underlying principle of classical counterinsurgency theory still obtains: politics and security (the civil and mil- itary pillars) are inextricably linked and must be consid- ered together. Acquire Expertise Diplomats’ effectiveness in carrying out counterinsur- gency work is a direct function of how well they know their area of responsibility, and how much that knowledge in- forms their judgment on a range of issues. This cannot be emphasized forcefully enough. If the diplomat is successful in this regard, over time other counterinsurgents — both civilian and military — will view that expertise as indispensable to their efforts. They will want her along during a patrol in a remote village where, recent in- telligence indicates, insurgent recruitment drives are gain- ing traction. Or they will pull him into the room when concluding a micro-credit financing scheme for local en- trepreneurs. But first, the diplomat must learn as much as possible about the people, history, politics and economics of the country. Possible lines of inquiry to assist in this effort include the following: 1. People. What is the population of the province or re- gion, and how is it broken down by gender and age? What are the population growth, birth and death rates? What are the infant mortality and fertility rates? What are the major infectious diseases? What is the literacy rate? 2. Religious and ethnic groups, major tribes, clans, sub- clans and extended families. What are the relationships and histories between the groups? What longstanding feuds exist, and why? To what extent have groups inter- married, and what political affiliations have developed as a result? What is the history of support of the various groups for the central government? Which groups have sent their youth to serve in the army or other national se- curity forces? 3. Geography. How much land is arable? How much is irrigated? What are the natural fresh water sources and are they disputed? What other natural resources exist in the province or region? Are they capable of extraction for commercial purposes? 4. Local leadership and governance. At the village, dis- trict and provincial levels, who are the influential leaders — political, religious, tribal or other? Who are their prin- cipal constituencies — that is, what are their sources of power? How effective are they in responding to the needs of the local population? How might they become more effective? Are local leaders supportive of the central gov- ernment? If there is historical antipathy toward the cen- tral government, do subnational structures (e.g., tribal councils) exist for the purposes of governance or dispute resolution? F O C U S Combat operations that do not contribute to the security of the population should be reconsidered.