The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 27 application of the principles sug- gested in this article. The diplomat with a sound strat- egy, thoroughly versed on the peo- ple and politics of a province, and in constant contact with the local pop- ulation, can make significant contri- butions to a combined counterinsur- gency campaign through linguistic, professional and area-specific ex- pertise acquired over many years. These hard-won skills include the ability to operate effectively in a dif- ficult, foreign environment; powers of persuasion and ne- gotiation; the capacity to decipher the various shadings of meanings conveyed by interlocutors; and a facility for ad- vancing governmental policies and programs. Systematic development of such a seasoned cadre of diplomat-counterinsurgents will take time and, more importantly, require key policy decisions that fall outside the scope of this article. The guide- lines set forth here are meant as in- struments in a toolbox from which the diplomat may choose. They are approaches to enhance a diplomat’s effectiveness, approaches that can be embraced now and with little cost. If the United States is to achieve lasting, durable victories in Afghani- stan, Iraq and future conflict zones, it is essential that civilians become as conversant with the fundamen- tals of counterinsurgency warfare as our military counter- parts already are. Failure to undertake this admittedly difficult task will reduce the diplomat’s effectiveness as a foreign affairs professional and diminish the likelihood that the United States government will achieve its long-term national security objectives. As diplomats, we can afford neither outcome. ■ F O C U S Diplomats’ effectiveness in carrying out counter- insurgency work is a direct function of how well they know their area of responsibility.