The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29 Teams, more than 130,000 troops, and a parallel civilian-military structure where neither the am- bassador nor commanding general leads, the organization chart for Iraq is extremely complicated. And before 2008, the government had only limited interagency strategic cooperation mechanisms that it could use there. Civilian and military experts have worked together for several years on PRTs, but not at a strategic level. The Multinational Force–Iraq and Embassy Baghdad do coordinate at the more senior lev- els, but strategies and operations are typically designed at the mid-level. Lieutenant colonels and majors needed to work more closely with civilian counterparts on strategy design and implementation. For years, embassies have drafted mission strategic plans describing strategic, management and performance goals for each country. Different agencies write goal pa- pers to identify their highest-priority goals, set forth how the U.S. will advance these goals, and list performance measures. But none of these plans motivated true inter- agency strategic planning; rather, they were a collection of inputs from government agencies that had little contact even though their work often overlapped. Around the world, U.S. interagency cooperation on na- tionbuilding was minimal until then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice introduced “Transformational Diplo- macy” in 2005. The Director of Foreign Assistance posi- tion at the State Department was created shortly thereafter to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is unified and supports foreign policy and national security objec- tives. The F Bureau’s Operational Plan brought together all aid flows into one document, but it did not bring all ac- tors into one room for strategic or even operational plan- ning. National Security Presidential Directive 44, promul- gated in 2005, authorized the State Department to estab- lish an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to lead the interagency response to interna- tional crises. S/CRS developed interagency planning pro- cedures; but three years after its creation, it still lacked the resources, credibility and experience to apply the model to real-world scenarios. Then in May 2008, the State Department and USAID introduced a Country Assistance Strategy approach to unify all U.S. assistance in support of host-coun- try priorities and American foreign policy goals. This program was pi- loted in 10 countries, and rolled out worldwide in 2009—with one glar- ing omission: Iraq. There, the U.S. government did not formulate an operational plan, did not coordinate foreign assistance through F, and did not apply the S/CRS model or develop an interagency country assistance strategy. As a result, none of these new approaches improved interagency planning in Iraq. Establishing JIATF In February 2008, the Defense Department’s Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction assessed U.S. assistance as “characterized by a continuing and dis- abling lack of coordination among the government agen- cies, contractors and other organizations involved. As much as any other factor, this lack of coordination— aris- ing from weak integration — has kept the U.S. program from achieving its objectives.” Only by improving collab- oration could the United States move toward the “joint- ness” necessary for successful operations. An interagency staffing request, endorsed by the com- manding general and chief of mission in April 2008, cre- ated the task force to synchronize the efforts of the interagency community and military in Iraq. Within weeks, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council approved the request, with a goal of full opera- tions by August 2008. Even before that deadline, civilian and military representatives were providing expertise on counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, and reach- ing back to colleagues in Baghdad andWashington. JIATF analyzed the problems, developed a course of action and proposed strategies to be included in the Joint Campaign Plan for approval by the commanding general and the am- bassador. The JCP for Iraq was the first interagency attempt to define all priorities, objectives and approaches to be taken by all U.S. agencies in Iraq, and represented the U.S. gov- ernment’s holistic strategy for achieving foreign policy and national security goals there. Approved by Amb. Crocker and General Raymond Odierno in December 2008, the JCP represented a landmark agreement on military and F O C U S Before 2008, the U.S. government had only limited interagency strategic cooperation mechanisms that it could use in Iraq.