The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 Measuring Success It is hard to measure JIATF-I’s success in countering these two complex strategic threats, espe- cially compared with JIATF-W or JIATF-S, where “tons of illicit drug shipments disrupted” might be a realistic indicator of progress. Sis- ter organizations in Baghdad, in- cluding the Iraq Threat Finance Cell and the Energy Fusion Cell, also deserve a big share of the credit for countering AQI. However, after just one year of solid JIATF-I intera- gency strategy design and implementation, one can already see results. Weakening of violent extremists has led to a 40-percent decrease in weekly attacks against coalition forces. Since JIATF began operations, Iraqis finally feel more upbeat about their future and less concerned about violence and insecurity. Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani reports less Iranian interference and support to militias than three years ago. And today Iraq is considered more free than at any time in its history. JIATF representatives created and managed the whole- of-government strategy expressed in the Joint Campaign Plan (and thus supported by all American agencies in Iraq), even without direct authority over resources. And by maintaining communication and tracking agency con- tributions to U.S. security goals, they identified missing or overlapping pieces and brought them to the attention of the chain of command. The result has been greater effectiveness, as the fol- lowing example dramatically illustrates. The Iraqi gov- ernment’s capacity to provide essential services, manage the budget and develop infrastructure is a pillar of the U.S. strategy to counter AQI and balance Iranian influence, ac- cording to the JCP. Yet USAID’s Local Governance Pro- gram, building capacity within Iraqi provincial govern- ments, had closed out in several provinces due to insuffi- cient funds. JIATF identified the strategic importance of civil ca- pacity and highlighted to senior interagency leaders the impact of the gap in diminished USAID support in that sector. News of the shortfall and reduced footprint reached strategic planners in CENTCOM and the Na- tional Security Council, and their support helped gain mo- mentum for a joint USAID/State decision to reallocate $33 million to this program. This mir- rors an overall funding concern monitored by the task force: As the U.S. military reduces its footprint, funding on the civilian side should increase to maintain support for Iraq’s government and nascent pri- vate sector. Interagency teams can identify shortfalls or overlaps and shift resources to meet strategic priorities. Ultimately, JIATF’s short-term interagency coordination fix will be replaced by the embassy, with the country team oversee- ing that process while its Iran Task Force focuses on bal- ancing the threat posed by Iran. The Way Forward: From Coordination to Integration Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently launched a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Re- view to improve the efficiency and level of cooperation among State, USAID and other civilian foreign affairs agencies. Based on the JIATF’s experience synchronizing different agencies on focused strategies to counter threats in Iraq, here are some observations from the field on how to improve interagency coordination and integration. Collaboration technology is necessary, but not sufficient. Human relations and behavior — not the technology and organizational mechanics of coordination — are the real barriers to interagency integration. In 2006, Ambassador Randall Tobias, then-USAID Administrator and director of foreign assistance, introduced reforms to centralize de- cision-making within the F Bureau, which relied on big databases such as the Operational Plan to get civilian agen- cies to share information. This resulted in parallel pipes of data flowing upward into F, with little substantive intera- gency cooperation. USAID’s weak communications systems and informa- tion management technology continue to constrain our ability to share information with other agency partners. Secure video teleconferencing is still relatively unknown; geographic information systems remain an unfulfilled promise; foreign assistance reporting systems are nascent and awkward; and classified e-mail connectivity with the rest of the government does not exist. These areas need to be strengthened, certainly, but they are less important than F O C U S Ultimately, JIATF’s short-term interagency coordination fix will be replaced by the embassy, with the country team overseeing that process.