The Foreign Service Journal, September 2009

38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 9 a dentist or doctor, families pur- chased groceries. Such daily needs must be addressed within a gover- nance and developmental frame- work by civilians who are inherently part of the resolution of the con- flict. State, USAID and other U.S. government agencies already have some of this expertise, but not nearly to the extent required. We need many more diplomats with practical experience who also know how to manage programs. How does one get the water system back on in some district in the Congo where people are being killed? How does one ad- minister a microfinance program in central Afghanistan? Even if we have technical experts on staff, Foreign Service personnel still have to go out into the field. An engineer from Colorado certainly knows how to get a dam to produce electricity. But he probably does not know how to help the local governing body raise money, hire engineers and create a tax base or corporation to make it all sustainable in a cross-cultural environment. That requires a well-trained economic development or governance officer. Most State and USAID employees don’t possess the combined skills needed either, so we have to acquire them through training or recruit people who already have them. Some of this knowledge already exists within USAID, but not exclusively so. In a conflict zone, development is directly tied to governance, so the job descriptions of the political officer at State and of the governance officer at USAID overlap. We need to build up both agencies at the institutional level to take on that role in a coopera- tive fashion. To be successful, State and USAID must also build a much stronger institutional partnership, with political of- ficers serving in USAID governance positions and vice versa, as part of each group’s career path. This is crucial experience that both sets of employees will need before entering a conflict zone. We also need mandatory crossover assignments in other cones within both organizations — particularly be- tween economic officers in State and economic develop- ment functions of USAID — to expand the practical knowledge and experience of our core diplomatic com- petencies. Short-Term vs. Long-Term Good governance and develop- ment are long-term objectives, but they still need to receive priority in U.S. policy. The military is all about making something happen right now — whether that means blow- ing something up, taking a hill or seizing a port. They focus single- mindedly on accomplishing the ob- jective, so everyone else better get out of the way. Development does not work that way at all. It’s not about what “we” do, but about strengthening the local government and setting up a cooperative process. The civilian role is one of mentor, trainer and partner, even if that means the local road (or school or dam) gets built on a slower schedule than if we did it ourselves. Over the last few years, Pakistan and the United States have pursued a joint developmental approach to reduc- ing poppy cultivation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Local officials built a road up to Tora Bora with help from the State Department’s International Nar- cotics and Law Enforcement Bureau. This was a long, la- borious effort but, along with other development projects, it empowered the local government and pro- vided alternative employment for the population. Local leaders decided who would crush the rock, where the road would go, whose apple orchard would be cut down to make room for the roadbed, who would cut the stone, who would get the contract for paving opera- tions, etc. The success of these kinds of projects helped reduce poppy growth to the point where the United Na- tions Development Program actually considered declar- ing the country poppy-free. Expand Civilian Reach In Iraq, I often found that my Defense Department colleagues understood the idea of development, but were unable to work patiently with a weak government strug- gling to find its legs. DOD’s emphasis on being opera- tionally effective was so great that local governance was squeezed out. Instead, the military found it easier to do things itself and then give the credit to local officials. However, because most of them either did nothing or ac- tively hindered U.S. efforts, this approach was counter- productive. F O C U S The problem isn’t just a lack of people. It is a matter of getting the right people with the proper training to where they are needed.