The Foreign Service Journal, September 2010

ies, thus threatening the long-term via- bility of the Afghan government. Be- cause America’s presence in Afghani- stan overlooks these core issues, current U.S. policy inadvertently contributes to the very instability that leaders inWash- ington ostensibly seek to forestall. If America’s interests lie in ensuring that the virus of violent anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region, a shift in U.S. policy must be two-pronged: the foreign troop presence should be scaled down, and Western leaders should harness Pak- istan’s influence over extremist prox- ies by encouraging Islamabad to help broker a political settlement in Af- ghanistan (possibly best done behind closed doors). No longer can U.S. policymakers re- main willfully blind to the reality that present operations are pushing Pak- istan toward further Balkanization. Its Pashtun-dominated regions along the Afghan border are almost fully Tal- ibanized. The Baluch people, long de- nied economic and political rights, continue their separatist insurgency. And given the ongoing urban and po- litical violence in Sindh, as well as Pun- jab, a perpetual state of internecine violence is Pakistan’s likely future. As Council on Foreign Relations Adjunct Senior Fellow Steve Simon writes: “Ultimately, the United States is caught in a vicious circle. In the face of a threatening al-Qaida hosted by the Taliban, the United States deepens its involvement in Afghanistan and Pak- istan. Al-Qaida and the Taliban re- spond to the U.S. presence with de- stabilizing violence and insurgent activ- ity. “The United States, in turn, re- sponds by applying more intense pres- sure, increasing civilian casualties and general instability—and thus weaken- ing the governments in Kabul and Is- lamabad, which benefits al-Qaida and the Taliban.” Unless Washington scales down its presence in Afghanistan, its policies could facilitate the self-fulfilling pro- phecy of an Islamist takeover of Pak- istan. Washington must also tackle head- on Pakistan’s own contribution to the region’s unfolding security challenges. Indeed, Islamabad wields significant influence over the region’s major stake- holders, including its long-time ally GulbuddinHekmatyar and Afghan Tal- iban leader MullahMuhammad Omar. Whether or not Pakistan can be per- suaded that its long-term interests lie in cooperating with its northern neighbor, it is clear that only Pakistan can co-opt these insurgent networks into a broader power-sharing arrangement. There was speculation that Kabul had already acceded to a partnership with Islamabad following the June res- ignations of Afghanistan’s intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, and Interior Minister Hanif Atmar — both viewed by Pakistan as obstacles to a settlement. Pakistani officials also have indicated their willingness to deliver Sirajuddin Haqqani, an al-Qaida ally whose fight- ers stretch across eastern Afghanistan. Cobbling together an Afghan gov- ernment that has the support of all of its key neighbors will be incredibly dif- ficult. However, denying al-Qaida safe havens is America’s primary objective; and only with Pakistan’s intervention will militant networks in the Pashtun tribal belt be prepared to break with al- Qaida. Only by developing a comprehen- sive South Asia strategy will there be hope for anything more than temporary peace in the region. Periodic troop surges, increased development aid and Predator drone attacks will do little in the long run, unless regional belliger- ents are convinced that their security does not lie in covertly funding terror- ist proxies. That strategic shift can come about only once a political door in Kabul is opened to Islamabad and overall Indo-Pakistani tensions recede. Washington cannot dictate such an outcome, but can facilitate it. ■ 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 0