42 SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL cluster within specific programs or policy shops, with limited formal mechanisms for sharing that knowledge across regions or issue areas. The result is familiar to anyone who’s worked in a large bureaucracy: duplication, delays, and missed opportunities. One practical fix is to designate “science policy leads” within certain bureaus, particularly those under the P, E, and T under secretariats. These leads wouldn’t operate as lone experts but as connective tissue: sitting on a cross-bureau Science Policy Council, coordinating technical input into planning cycles, and helping staff tap into relevant partnerships or surge expertise. Equally important is creating a mechanism to stand up—and, critically, stand down—cross-bureau S&T working groups. During my time helping to launch an innovation lab within a consulting firm, one of the biggest lessons was that not every challenge needs a permanent committee. What matters is clarity of scope, speed of formation, and a shared understanding of when the work has been successfully completed. Applied to the department, this kind of agile coordination could be transformative, especially for fast-moving issues like synthetic biology or space governance, which cut across thematic and regional divides. Science-informed diplomacy doesn’t mean every desk officer needs a PhD. It means they need access to knowledge, to networks, and to people who can help translate complexity into strategy. That starts by giving bureaus the internal muscle to organize, synthesize, and act. Designing for the Long View S&T are not just fast-moving, they’re disruptive. AI governance, biothreats, critical minerals, planetary boundary tipping points—these are issues that reshape alliances, markets, and geopolitics. Yet too often, State Department leadership is forced into a reactive stance, navigating crises with incomplete information and little time to think ahead. The solution isn’t a bigger bureaucracy; it’s a smarter structure. At the leadership level, the department should formalize a Science Policy Council, previously mentioned, that includes senior representatives from important bureaus and offices. This council would be tasked with surfacing cross-cutting science priorities, aligning policy development across bureaus, and serving as a high-leverage advisory node for senior decision-makers. Paired with this, the department needs a formal horizon scanning and foresight function, a capacity to look ahead at emerging risks and opportunities, not just respond to what’s already on the front page. During my time across USAID, MCC, and State, I saw how long-term initiatives like Feed the Future were shaped (or limited) by whether upstream alignment and technical forecasting were in place. When it works, good foresight can align agencies, inform budget cycles, and shape diplomatic posture well before events unfold. Leadership doesn’t need to predict the future, but it must be better positioned to anticipate it. A council for science policy, informed by structured foresight, is not an extra step. It’s the operating system upgrade diplomacy now requires—quiet, efficient, and absolutely essential. Smarter by Design Having worked across institutions, from embassy coordination tables to innovation labs to field programs and interagency strategy, I’ve seen the costs of fragmentation and the power of thoughtful systems. The diplomats I’ve supported aren’t asking for more experts; they’re asking for better access, smarter pathways, and the confidence that their decisions are informed by the best available knowledge. Getting there is possible. It doesn’t take massive new investments, just a shift in how we think about S&T as part of diplomacy’s core operating logic. With a few practical changes, we can build a department better wired for complexity, resilience, and the future that’s already arriving. n In complex environments, even a small injection of tailored insight can shift how diplomats prepare, negotiate, or respond.
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