The Foreign Service Journal, September 2012

prior to G-20 meetings, with a total in- crease of 14 percent over the past two years. Helping close the sale back home. The administration has also tailored its requests of other govern- ments to domestic political sensitivi- ties. No foreign leader wants to be seen as doing the bidding of America, after all. So when U.S. officials press China to rebalance its economy from exports toward domestic consump- tion, they stress that Beijing’s own Five-Year Plan calls for exactly that shift. Converting “rule-takers” to “rule-makers.” Many key multilat- eral norms and mechanisms are due for updating, and the emerging stake- holders should be actively involved. This is a valuable opportunity to strengthen their sense of ownership and constructive participation. Recent climate change negotiations offer vital lessons in the need to adjust expectations and prepare for a steady slog. Because of the chaotic atmos- phere at the December 2009 U.N. meeting in Copenhagen, the forum’s real achievements have gotten short shrift. Thanks both to Pres. Obama’s per- sonal intervention and heightened global scrutiny, China and India made their first-ever commitments to cut the carbon intensity of their economic growth, and China relented on meas- urement and reporting. Participating nations, comprising nearly the entire world, committed themselves to the goal of capping a maximum aggregate temperature increase at two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit). Leveraging international insti- tutions. The administration has great- ly increased U.S. engagement with in- ternational institutions, taking advan- tage of their built-in mechanisms to spread the burden for maintenance of the rules-based order. For instance, United Nations member-states collec- tively contribute more than 100,000 peacekeepers a year, deployments that benefit the U.S. by bringing stability to wartorn regions. For every dollar the U.S. lends to the International Mone- tary Fund’s bailout mechanism, other governments collectively lend five. The United States has pushed to ensure that any increase in voice that emerging powers get in international institutions is closely linked to in- creased contributions. At the IMF, an increase in voting shares automatically triggers an increase in mandated con- tributions. The Group of 20’s annual leader summit has important symbolism in gathering emerging and established powers as peers, and rising powers have actually led the group into new areas such as economic development and anti-corruption. The G-20 has adopted a Mutual Assessment Pro- cess, whereby member-states review and critique each other’s growth plans. This motivates them to weigh domes- tic policy choices in the context of shared responsibility for a strong, bal- anced global economy. In another tactic to induce respon- sible action, the United States has championed the Trans-Pacific Part- nership, an exclusive institution-in-for- mation where responsibility is the price of admission. The TPP trade ini- tiative sets high standards for labor, environmental and intellectual prop- erty protections, and only countries willing to meet them may negotiate their entry. While Asia’s largest trad- ing nation, China, currently falls short of those goals, the TPP might prod Beijing to make improvements to meet the threshold for eligibility. In other cases, the administration has sought to induce responsibility within institutions other pivotal pow- ers value by highlighting when the in- stitution is failing a basic test of credibility. In March, when the U.N. Security Council debated the Arab League peace plan for Syria, Sec. Clinton argued that withholding sup- port for the plan “would mark a failure of our shared responsibility and shake the credibility of the United Nations Security Council.” Leading by example. The ad- ministration has been explicit about the need for the United States to keep its own house in order as it calls on others to do their civic duty. Consider, for example, nuclear nonproliferation, a U.S. priority. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty represents a bargain between the world’s nuclear “haves” and “have- nots” requiring (a) that non-nuclear weapon nations stay that way and (b) that the world’s nuclear “haves” dis- arm. To keep the diplomatic upper hand in critical negotiations over Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs, the United States has needed to show good faith in reducing its Cold War stockpile. Indeed, some Republican senators who voted for the U.S.-Russ- ian New START arms treaty acknowl- edged this in the ratification debate. The responsibility message. A consistent message about the duties of membership in the world community is also essential to the responsibility doctrine. Often, the strongest case for others to follow America’s lead is to argue in terms of civic obligations and the rules of the road. These themes have been a drumbeat of the foreign policy message in recent years. 50 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 2 If the responsibility doctrine succeeds, emerging powers will internalize the duties that come with being a stakeholder.