The Foreign Service Journal, September 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2013 37 many Americans who “believe in God Almighty,” as it is deli- cately phrased in Indonesia’s ecumenical national ideology, Pancasila. Despite several recent violent attacks in Indonesia on reli- gious minorities, including Shia and Ahmadi communities, the vast majority of Indonesians abhor religious violence. Signifi- cant Christian and Hindu minorities, for example, generally live peacefully alongside the Muslimmajority. This peaceful majority of religious believers is not monolithic, however. Though roughly 88 percent of Indonesians are Muslims, their beliefs range from modern liberalism to Javanese mysticism to deep conservatism, with many other shades in between, as well. The Role of Indonesian Intellectuals Within this mosaic of Islamic belief, intellectuals associated with traditional mainstream groups have played a prominent role in Indonesia. The nation’s late president, Abdurrahman Wahid, is a perfect example of these moderate intellectuals. Steeped in Javanese religious tradition and wielding enormous moral authority, Wahid spoke eloquently for tolerance and pluralism. Following in his footsteps, mainstream religious scholars pepper Indonesian religious institutions today. Because many of these intellectuals are Western-educated and fluent in English, and have an easy manner with foreigners, they quickly became the foci of international seminars, exchanges and interfaith dia- logues, including some hosted by the United States. For that reason, it was easy to forget that these figures do not necessarily represent the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Indeed, “liberal” has become a word that many Indonesian con- servatives use to reject interpretations of Islam they feel do not reflect traditional values. Engaging members of these groups is inherently more difficult than reaching out to Western-educated elite figures. Because Indonesian conservatives generally do not speak Eng- lish, come from a purely Quranic educational tradition and have a rural background, it can be a struggle to find common ground. Moreover, with strong views on Israel and the Middle East, and little international experience, conservatives are often suspicious of U.S. motives. Yet, at least in Indonesia, religious conservatives do not have closed minds. They often thirst for U.S. engagement and are eager to learn more about our foreign policy and life in the United States. It is precisely this segment of the population that most profits from our engagement, and has the most to tell us about Islam in Indonesia. The Importance of Systematic Engagement Without recounting everything about Embassy Jakarta’s strat- egy here, I will note that we pursued systematic engagement—a sustained effort to include conservative representatives in all embassy activities, outreach and exchanges. Here are two small examples. Earlier this year, after an Israeli action inflamed Indonesian public opinion, a conservative Muslim student leader sent me a virulently anti-Semitic text message. Furious, I was tempted to delete him frommy address book and block his messages. Instead, I sent a polite but strong rebuttal. After a long exchange about the hatefulness of anti-Semitism, he replied: “I think you are right. I shouldn’t have written something like that. I won’t anymore.” In another case, we invited a conservative youth group to a discussion at @america, the embassy’s new, high-tech public diplomacy venue. This particular group is often at odds with U.S. policy and sometimes demonstrates in front of the embassy to protest U.S. policies in the Middle East. Our initial discussion was candid but friendly. Afterward, some in the local Muslim press excoriated the group for attending a U.S.-hosted activity. Undaunted, the students have returned for more embassy-sponsored events, where opinions are expressed with more tempered language and reflect greater understanding of U.S. policy. Encouragingly, other conservative groups have followed in their footsteps. Lessons Learned Ties between the United States and Indonesia, two of the world’s largest democracies, are of key importance to U.S. national interest as we enter America’s Pacific Century. Main- taining friendly relations will require continued, sustained effort, and people-to-people ties to overcome suspicion about U.S. intentions. In deeply religious Indonesia, engaging Muslim leaders will be important to people-to-people ties. But to be effective, we must be sure to engage a wide swath of religious leaders—not just a select group of like-minded Indonesians. Polling suggests that our approach has reduced suspicion of Americans among a key sector of Indonesian society, but it is hard to ascribe the improvement to a specific factor or to assess its staying power. Our experience also suggests that systematic engagement could be similarly beneficial else- where in the Muslim world, particularly if posts break out of the usual, well-worked circles of local contacts to engage conservatives. n