The Foreign Service Journal, September 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2013 57 assistant secretary level and above—i.e., under secretaries and deputy secretaries—held by FSOs at State has plum- meted from about 60 percent to about 24 percent at the end of 2012. According to the State Department’s own figures (which depend on electronic data and begin 10 years later) measuring assistant secretary and equivalent positions, but not the more senior positions, the Foreign Service role has shrunk steadily from 44 percent of the positions in 1982 to only 25 percent of these positions in 2012. By either measure,the Foreign Service has been relegated to a distinct minority in the senior policy ranks at State. While we do not claim expertise on the U.S. Agency for International Development, the situation for FSOs serving in Senate-confirmed positions there appears even worse, with only two USAID FSOs attaining such positions in the past decade. The number of State FSOs serving as deputy assistant secretaries and in equivalent positions also appears to have suffered a decline. While the department has no electronic data available, those who were serving in the 1970s state that the overwhelming preponderance of DASs were State Foreign Service officers. Currently, FSOs occupy only 54 percent of such positions, a number that has remained basically consis- tent over the period for which the department has data. A Wake-Up Call The implications of these facts must be faced. Our intent in writing the Washington Post op-ed was, and remains, to issue a wake-up call about what we see as a long-term deterioration in the role of the Foreign Service. If that role is to be redefined, then that process needs to be explicit, public and the subject of a discussion that has not yet taken place. The argument we are making is simple. The U.S. needs, and the Foreign Service Act of 1980 calls for, a strong, profes- sional Foreign Service. That mandate requires attention to the Service’s role in the conduct of policy, just as it requires disci- pline, training and responsibility on the part of Foreign Service members. There is also a need for a strong and more flexible Civil Service, but the two systems are rubbing up against each other in unproductive ways. These fundamental problems need to be addressed head- on, rather than massaged on the margins with significant political and policy issues left invisible in the public discus- sion. The growing number of political appointments reaching down into the Department of State and USAID is weakening the Foreign Service. To be clear, we are not protesting against non-career appointments, per se. Rather, the issue is one of scale and competence. Large numbers of non-career appointments at the senior and mid-levels in Washington, as is increasingly happening, drain the institution of its professional character, and give too much weight to political and partisan interests at the expense of advice gained from the conduct of diplomacy in the field. This compounds the longstanding problem of non- career ambassadors whose appointments, in many cases, are the result of a process of raising campaign funds—and often fail to meet the requirements laid out in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended, regarding qualifications. In addition, we must examine the requirements for achiev- ing a first-class Foreign Service and nurture its strong role within the Department of State. An Elite, but Not Elitist Each of these issues requires a degree of explanation that the space constraints of a newspaper opinion piece regrettably precludes. First, however, we need to address the meaning of elitism vs. elite, a criticism generated by the earlier piece. The former term describes a mental and social attitude sug- gesting an expectation of superiority, privilege and exclusion of others. That is not the Foreign Service we desire. “Elite,” on the other hand, is an adjective describing organizations that have highly competitive requirements for entrance and advancement, and emphasize public service, maintain high professional standards and demand that members make the sacrifices necessary to gain objectives. But to say that any attempt to create and maintain an elite Foreign Service is “elitism” is to allow political correctness to run amok. For instance, one can believe that Seal Team 6 (the United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group) is an elite force without denigrating the rest of the U.S. Navy, or Only a truly merit-based, representative, professional corps can carry out American diplomacy and grow the broad leadership “bench” required to meet future needs.