The Foreign Service Journal, September 2013

60 SEPTEMBER 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL experience required for senior Foreign Service positions. This advice has been offered repeatedly since the 1960s, but largely ignored. Since the British seem to do this well, perhaps we should look there, and to our military, for ideas on reversing such shortsightedness. In a sense, it is the responsibility of the leadership within the State Department and the Foreign Ser- vice to recognize the importance of experience in functional policy bureaus, and to provide clear incentives or, at least, remove the disincentives. While the loss of career opportu- nities is one facet of the problem, the Foreign Service as an institution must strengthen its own professional integrity and discipline. One solution would be a comprehensive review of posi- tion distribution between Civil Service and Foreign Service in the functional bureaus, and some functional positions in the regional bureaus. Foreign Service officers would benefit from experience in functional policy bureaus and, at the same time, the bureaus will be strengthened by having the perspectives and experience of these Foreign Service officers. The goal of the review would be to specify and recommend a Civil Service–Foreign Service job distribution reflecting the advantages of each. Expanding rotational programs for the Civil Service should also be considered. …and the Civil Service Today’s Foreign Service needs a strong, positive partner- ship with the Civil Service, which offers invaluable technical expertise on issues ranging from administrative matters and arms control to climate change and trade. To say that every- one brings value to the system is undeniably true. However, that does not mean Foreign Service personnel cannot master these issues—much less that the two systems are the same or can be managed the same way. Nor does it deal with the fact that political appointees are increasingly burrowing into the Civil Service, undercutting its meritocratic traditions. The replacement of the Civil Service exam with hiring mechanisms that tailor jobs to a particular candidate has opened the door to non-career employees hiring their associates—who then occupy positions on a per- manent basis in a kind of stealth Schedule C exercise without the rigor and limits that have been attached to the formal process. The State Department’s inspector general recently flagged an extreme example of this abuse in the Bureau of Interna- tional Information Programs and concluded that a “pervasive perception of cronyism exists in the bureau, aggravating the serious morale problem. One original consultant stayed on, becoming a GS-15 Civil Service employee. A second private- sector associate, originally hired as a Schedule B employee, also became a GS-15. One received a quality step increase award shortly afterward. In both cases, some of their duties fall well outside the scope of the responsibilities stipulated in their position descriptions.” Nor is the problem purely political. There are now multiple routes into the Civil Service for contractors, interns and Presi- dential Management Fellows. What these all have in common is the role of influence. As important as subject-matter expertise is, civil servants also need to appreciate how their role fits into larger foreign policy issues and learn how to negotiate. Rotation of civil servants through a variety of jobs to gain such expertise is important and should be encouraged. The problem is that once Civil Service personnel occupy domestic positions, most of them don’t rotate out as they do from an overseas excursion assignment. The result is to remove rotational opportunities for the Foreign Service that are essential for teaching newer colleagues how to operate within the interagency process of Washington. We therefore need to establish a rational process for Civil Service rotations into domestic positions that is followed unless there are com- pelling reasons for an exception. These problems are not new, of course. Structural flaws have crept into the personnel system at State, USAID and the other foreign affairs agencies over many years, and under the leadership of both political parties. In our judgment, however, these issues are generating friction between Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel. The vehemence with which some The question for America should be whether it needs a specialized, responsive and dedicated Foreign Service meriting the appellation “elite”—and whether it now has one.