The Foreign Service Journal, September 2014

20 SEPTEMBER 2014 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL often suit their organizational missions. (6) A recognition by the Service that personal rank and salary do not necessarily have to equate to manage- ment responsibilities at the top. While the Service needs good management, it especially needs good—even excel- lent—professional judgment and persuasive skills, which are normally developed by FSOs as they gain experi- ence. Presidents are not elected primar- ily for their management skills, nor are Secretaries of State so chosen. So why do we think that senior diplomats, dealing with similar affairs of state, should be so judged—and be selected out if they cannot all squeeze into top management positions? As much or more rides on the abil- ity of Foreign Service practitioners to analyze, report and persuade others, both at home and abroad, regarding a foreign situation or a U.S. foreign policy issue. Success in these skills is also the secret to leadership of other govern- ment agencies. We can only manage their foreign activities if they, too, respect our expertise, based on our successful performance, and not just at the top. (7) Recognition that the principal attraction of the Foreign Service is that of any other profession (e.g., teach- ing, economics, law, journalism, the military)—the nature of the life and work itself. Financial rewards in the FS are certainly limited and not primary motivators. Also limited are high rank, titles and promotions; they, too, should not be primary motivators. Foreign Service work consists of helping to formulate, and then carry out, U.S. foreign policy, and generally to conduct the business of the U.S. government abroad. This means under- standing how foreign governments and their people think and operate. Dedica- tion, experience, interest in foreign cultures and commitment to a life of service alongside others with similar ambitions—along with a willingness to accept physical dangers, health risks and psychological vicissitudes—should remain the primary motivators. The Service can afford to sacrifice some rapidity of promotion to avoid slotting officers into positions for which they are not ready (thus avoiding the “Peter Principle”) and keep experi- enced people in the ranks, doing what they do best, even if they never reach the top. (8) As to arguments in favor of a “half-dozen good people” to control policymaking in Washington, and the concomitant desire for a special track to produce them, let the Service build one informally. But make this the exception, not the rule. Those who have a significant role in formulating Washington policy (as distinct from providing the factual basis and analysis on which such policy is based) will always be a small minority. The Service can afford to keep experienced people in the ranks, doing what they do best, even if they never reach the top.