The Foreign Service Journal, September 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2014 25 human rights were all fused into a common conception. It was an early example of the whole-of-government approach, which the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review recommended for the entire State Department. Af-Pak: A “Diplomatic Campaign” My recall to the State Department gave me the chance to pursue another fusion of national goals and instruments: the 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced Richard Holbrooke’s appoint- ment as the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan on Jan. 22, 2009, they sent a message beyond South Asia. Sec. Clinton wanted SRAP to show that the whole-of- government philosophy—employing expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation’s most important challenges—was the right model for 21st- century diplomacy. After Holbrooke’s sudden death in December 2010, some asked if that effort to make and execute policy at the State Department in a unique way would continue. Sec. Clinton promised that it would; and, starting in February 2011, when I was appointed to succeed Holbrooke, I pursued the whole-of- government approach, which I had advocated and practiced in earlier diplomatic assignments. Pres. Obama laid the foundations for the 2011-2012 diplo- matic effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the first two years of his administration. Sec. Clinton launched it in a speech at the Asia Society in New York on Feb. 18, 2011. In her remarks, she made clear that the military surge then underway in Afghanistan was a vital part of American strategy. Without the heroic effort of U.S. forces, joined by many allies, friends and partners, there was no chance of pursuing a diplomatic end to 30 years of conflict. She also reminded her audience of the civilian surge underway in Afghanistan, which had brought thousands of courageous Americans from many U.S. government agen- cies, as well as international and Afghan civilians, to promote economic development, good governance, the power of civil society and the advancement of women within their society. In her speech, Sec. Clinton called for a “diplomatic surge” to match the military and civilian efforts to try to catalyze and shape a political end to years of war. This meant drawing together all of our diplomatic resources to engage the countries in the region to support Afghanistan. It also meant, she said, trying to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban to see if they were ready to talk to the Afghan government about the future. We decided to refer to our effort to create this surge as a “diplomatic campaign” to emphasize that this would not be a series of ad hoc engagements, but rather an effort that fol- lowed a comprehensive plan. The campaign would require simultaneous, coordinated action by the SRAP team to con- nect the military effort with the instruments of nonmilitary power in South and Central Asia, including official develop- ment assistance, involvement of the private sector, support for civil society, and the use of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. As we reviewed the diplomatic calendar after Sec. Clin- ton’s speech, we devised, with our Afghan partners, a road map designed to shape, guide and leverage four international meetings already set for 2011-2012. The first was the Novem- ber 2011 meeting of Afghanistan’s neighbors in Istanbul, designed to define the region’s stake in a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan and what they could do to make that happen. The second was the December 2011 international meeting in Bonn to mobilize post-2014 support for Afghani- stan. Third was the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago; and fourth was an international gathering to promote economic development in Afghanistan, set for Tokyo on July 8, 2012. Beginning in March 2011, the SRAP team systematically imagined what could be achieved for the United States, the international community, Afghanistan and the region by the time the Tokyo meeting ended 17 months later. Our plan defined what needed to be accomplished at each meeting and the work that had to be done to produce that result. Every aspect of the diplomatic campaign was integrated to achieve It is through recognition of the power and necessity of simultaneity, and a “whole-of- government” approach, that one could imagine a synthesis of traditional diplomacy and a diplomacy of the future.