The Foreign Service Journal, September 2016

12 SEPTEMBER 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL American influence (under Ngo Dinh Diem) merely replaced French domina- tion. Even had the United States adopted a unified and enduring anti-corruption approach, neither Diem nor Nguyen Van Thieu (or the revolving door of generals between them) could have established strong popular legitimacy for a simple reason: The ROV fought for its own sepa- rate survival as the de facto successor to a colonial administration, with no more than lip-service paid to Vietnamese nationalism and unification. In contrast, North Vietnam, led by nationalist—albeit Communist—figures credited for the end of French rule, pur- sued national unification with ruthless focus that garnered support in large swaths of the South quite ignorant of Karl Marx or Cold War politics. Saigon fell quickly in 1975, not because the Nixon administration “took its eye off the ball” on corrup- tion or because Army of the Republic of Vietnam generals were pocketing ghost soldier salaries, but because the ROV never was a sustainable entity. And in 1975 (unlike 1965, 1968 or 1972), Ameri- can forces were not employed to rescue a state that had no legitimate claim to birth or continued existence. It is, in fact, quite plausible that Diem would have fallen earlier had he refused to countenance the corruption that the Saigon elite had mastered during French rule. Also, the historical record is replete with examples of corruption, profiteer- ing and other malfeasance in North Vietnam during the war; and corruption remains a scourge in Vietnam today. Yet Hanoi won, despite its own corruption and enduring bombing well exceeding the combined totals for U.S. bombing of Germany and Japan in World War surprise and disappointment that the first program in the listing, the National Security Language Institute for Youth, requires only a 2.5 GPA.) Jan Zehner FSO, retired Ogden, Utah Legitimacy and Corruption in Vietnam I enjoyed the June FSJ ’s focus on the corrosive impact of corruption, espe- cially having witnessed the distorting and counterproductive effects of poorly managed project funding in Iraq and Afghanistan. I similarly continue to appreciate State Depart- ment Historian Stephen Randolph’s analyses (and commentary in the Foreign Relations series), including his case study (based in part on a post-war RAND survey) on the role of corruption in undermining U.S. objectives during the Vietnam conflict. However, it is critical to distinguish between root causes and attendant symptoms. The Saigon regime’s corrup- tion was the latter, and South Vietnam’s artificial character and lack of political legitimacy from inception to collapse could not have been cured by a bolder or more consistent dose of American anti- corruption programming. Salvaged as a non-Communist rump entity after Dien Bien Phu, the Republic of Vietnam inherited the French colonial bureaucracy and erstwhile French/ Vichy/Japanese puppet emperor Bao Dai as head of state. The ROV’s rejec- tion of the Geneva provision for national elections (which Ho Chi Minh certainly would have won) solidified the funda- mental illegitimacy of the regime. II, because of single-minded pursuit of intangibles—national unity and rejection of foreign interference—supported by a majority of Vietnamese in most sections of the country. As we champion anti-corruption efforts in our diplomacy (and ensure bet- ter stewardship of taxpayer resources in future stability operations), it is critical to identify and learn from the core reasons for our Vietnam tragedy and not again fall under an illusion that we can invent a sustainable partner polity irrespective of a foreign political culture’s legitimacy traditions. Neil Hop FSO Washington, D.C. Aid to Africa: The Policy Context Permit me to comment on Don Lot- ter’s interesting article regarding aid to education in Africa in the April issue of your excellent journal (“Development Aid to Africa: Time for Plan B?”). The United States and other donors have been funding education programs and projects in African countries for decades. Many have been quite success- ful. Others have failed—in most cases not because they were ill-designed or badly managed, but because political strife and civil conflicts ruined them along with other aid activities. Unfortunately, this is likely to continue in many countries. Mr. Lotter states that “foreign aid has failed to pull sub-Saharan Africa out of poverty,” and refers to “the failure of development aid.” Such opinion deserves comment on several counts. First, only a country can advance itself. Outside aid can help, but cannot do the job absent a strong will and con- tinued positive effort from the receiving country.