The Foreign Service Journal, September 2016

In Defense of Dissent Recently 51 Foreign Service officers serving in the State Department and abroad signed a dissent memoran- dum criticizing the Obama administration’s Syria policy and calling for a more robust military response for both strategic and humanitar- ian reasons. The dissenters and their views are already referred to as “Dissent 51.” The public reaction has been generally favorable. Even those strongly dis- agreeing with the dissent- ers reluctantly lauded their courage. They were right to do so. Since 1970 some dissenters have prospered; others have seen their careers wither. All have done their duty. Dissent as a duty flows from the Foreign Service officer’s oath of office. We swear “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Our loyalty must be first and foremost to the national interest, and that means we must give political leader- ships our best analysis and advice, whether such is welcome or not. With respect to Syria, some commentators criticized the fact that the dissent was made public. Others were dismissive, claiming that the State Department’s “Dissent Channel” never makes a dif- ference to foreign policy. Here is my take based on the personal experience of having used the Dis- sent Channel to attempt to change our Cyprus policy in 1974, over 25 years as a judge on the panel select- ing winners of the William R. Rivkin Award for “construc- tive dissent,” and on the study incident to lecturing entering FSOs on “Advocacy and Dissent” since 1988. On the issue of making dissenting views public, the choice is neither easy nor clear. If career diplomats take their dissenting views to the media and Congress, it is “leaking,” bordering on disloyalty. If the adminis- tration argues its views to the media and Congress on background, it is “strategic communications.” I chose to keep my dissent in house, and have been haunted by that decision since. My dissent failed to change policy. As a result, the Greek military junta staged a coup on Cyprus that overthrew President Makarios, which led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which led to an attack on our embassy in Nicosia in which my friend and col- league, Ambassador Roger Davies (among others), was murdered. If I had “gone public,” it might well have generated a policy change blocking the Greek colonels’ coup on Cyprus, which would have erased the Turkish pretext for invading the Island, which would have allowed Roger Davies to raise his children. The decision on “outing the dissent” is nei- ther easy to make, nor easy to live with. The claim that the Dis- sent Channel never matters is historically inaccurate and shallow. The six major dis- sents since establishment of the Dissent Channel con- tradict the cynicism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, dissent against the policy in Vietnam was wide-spread among career officers. Without a Dissent Channel, several resigned. Within a decade the views of the dis- senters had been vindicated by events on the ground. In 1970-1971 more than 20 FSOs at the consulate general in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and in the department sent a Dissent Channel message criticizing U.S. inaction in the face of a murderous onslaught by the West Pakistan Army. The Blood Telegram (Knopf Dou- bleday, 2013) gives an excel- lent account of this perhaps unavoidable tragedy; Archer Blood was consul general in Dhaka at the time. In 1974 dissent over Cyprus policy failed. Histori- cal articles and books have since made it clear that the responsible FSOs cor- rectly analyzed the situa- tion and proposed specific actions that might well have forestalled the crisis and avoided the subsequent policy and human disasters. Views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the AFSA Retiree VP. Contact: boyatt@afsa.org | (202) 338-4045 RETIREE VP VOICE | BY TOM BOYATT AFSA NEWS In the mid-1990s, more than a dozen FSOs dealing with the disintegration of Yugoslavia sent a dissent memorandum arguing for a robust military response to Serbian ethnic cleansing. Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with the dissidents and within a short period U.S, policy changed dramatically. President Clin- ton ordered action against the Serbs, including the bombing of Belgrade for 79 straight days. Their return to the negotiating table gave the entire region a second chance. (The talks leading to the Dayton Accords were led on the U.S. side by the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, an FSO who had resigned over Vietnam.) Iraq and Afghanistan have witnessed much dis- sent, formal and informal, involving serving FSOs and their retired colleagues. These debates continue, to the great benefit of the national interest. Dissent at the State Department has a long and honorable record, which is why Secretary John F. Kerry is respectful of the process. Many among the political leaderships, the media, historians and informed citi- zens are equally respectful. It is for us to honor our past, and the brave and loyal colleagues who have joined the honor roll over Syria. We salute you, “Dissent 51.” n 62 SEPTEMBER 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL