The Foreign Service Journal, September 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2017 55 president’s E.O., because my intent was to address the order’s objectives rather than the more controversial implementation methods. Many in the State Department rightfully focused on the ideal of fairness; my approach was to propose solutions based on best practices to achieve the order’s stated aims. The E.O. vs. Current Practices The language of the executive order directly reflects the mis- sion statement of the Diplomatic Security Overseas Criminal Investigation program (OCI). For instance, the E.O. states its purpose thus: “to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis with the intent to cause harm, or who are at risk of caus- ing harm subsequent to their admission.” The order further speaks to the importance of in-person interviews and databases of identity documents, along with the problems of duplicated documents, evaluating criminal intent and similar issues. The DS Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan presented to Congress in 2006 called for the aggressive expansion of this OCI initiative to meet three specific, strategic goals: defend- ing the homeland and foreign partners from terrorist attack through aggressive and coordinated international law enforce- ment action; detecting terrorist activity, methods and trends that exploit international travel vulnerabilities; and disrupting terrorist efforts to use fraudulent documents by strengthening the capacities of foreign partners. OCI has already laid the foundation to achieve and produce much of the desired information and capabilities outlined in the E.O. via the overseas Assistant Regional Security Office for Inves- tigations (ARSO-I) program, which is embedded in consular sec- tions worldwide. OCI has also made significant contributions to other White House priorities, such as the disruption of transna- tional criminal organizations involved in human trafficking and smuggling of people, including special-interest aliens. Recommendations My Dissent Channel message contained a number of recom- mendations: setting up a Visa Security Task Force Pilot Program, led by DS, with established reporting requirements to identify country-specific threats to visa security; mandating and sup- porting the establishment of ARSO-I—vetted host-nation law enforcement units in strategic locations; increasing the amount of fraudulent document identification and impostor detection training and providing an independent (non-Leahy) funding source for document inspection equipment that can be easily donated to host-nation officials; re-negotiating existing agree- ments with other U.S. law enforcement agencies to increase the amount of law enforcement information shared with consular officers for use in the adjudication process; and expanding DS headquarters’ analytical support for the ARSO-I program to cover open source analysis and social media exploitation of specified applicants. Pres. Trump’s executive order stated his desire to increase the U.S. govern- ment’s ability to apply additional screening to visa applicants by using information known to the respective host country to assess an applicant’s intent. However, the majority of these countries do not track or cannot produce records in a suitable format. In addition, identifying an individual’s intent is compli- cated by cultural differences and a lack of context. Moreover, the lack of automation and advanced internet services throughout most of the world, including the countries identified in the order, is exactly why the State Department needs to leverage and promote the expertise of DS—specifically its implementation of vetted host-nation units—as a matter of policy. The Department Response The Diplomatic Security Bureau’s leadership used some of these recommendations as talking points during working group sessions with the Bureau of Consular Affairs. DS also used some of them when meeting with officials from the National Security Council to discuss future visa security initiatives. The State Department’s response was DS-centric rather than department-centric, and was in line with requirements outlined in the Foreign Affairs Manual. It also directly or indi- rectly addressed the majority of topics I raised in my cable. The department acknowledged that DS plays a leading role in the State Department in implementing visa security initiatives, and outlined the many proactive steps DS is taking to increase its international footprint and law enforcement actions under the ARSO-I program. The department also agreed that it may be time to update the 2006 Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan. The department did not, however, address the underlying The State Department agreed that it may be time to update the 2006Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan.