The Foreign Service Journal, September 2018

40 SEPTEMBER 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL arose and their implications for efficiency and security. Finally, I offer some recommendations that—if backed by sustained, high-level management commitment—can set the department on an effective path for the future. Revamping the organization to reshape and manage State’s information technology under- pinnings is critical to supporting overdue, broader management reforms necessitated by dramatic changes in the nature of foreign affairs challenges. Past as Prologue The current situation reflects the history of IT at the State Department and the consequences of decisions, and non-deci- sions, taken over the past three decades. Broad-scale computing at State started in the early 1980s with the introduction of Wang mainframe and word processing systems, often at the initiative of “early adopters” who saw the utility of computers over typewriters. There was little centralized capability or organization to man- age these systems, and individual offices and bureaus purchased them and used them as they saw fit. Bureaus paid for these com- puters, typically made the decisions about what and when to buy, and expected employees to share computer terminals. State management gradually recognized the utility of having a unified information technology organization. In 1998, it created the Bureau of Information Resource Management from some— but not all!—elements of the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Information Management. From the start, IRMwas playing catch-up: State IT was already decentralized, and bureaus contin- ued to fill the vacuum by creating solutions to meet their needs. “Functional” bureaus (including the Bureau of Administration) set about building core IT systems for accounting, human resources, logistics, etc. This decentralization had the advantage of putting bureaus in charge of systems that met their specific needs; but it came at the cost of duplicating efforts, and creating and institu- tionalizing inefficiencies. With no coherent centralized initiative to unite systems “owned” by various bureaus and posts, it was the Bureau of Con- sular Affairs—with its obvious requirement for consistent consular systems globally, and utilizing funds retained from consular collections—that finally set a consistent standard for desktop computers, albeit only for consular personnel. Finally, with the (mostly imaginary) Y2K threat looming, IRMwas funded to establish consistent global standards for Microsoft-based desktop computers. As federal IT evolved, laws came into force creating chief information officers (CIOs) at each agency and defining their roles. But, like other federal agencies, the State Department was slow to adjust its policies and bureaucracy and is still far from complying with current law and standards. State first created the CIO as a solely advisory position in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, only later making the CIO the head of IRM, a bureau still focused on managing core communications systems. Even today, State’s CIO is often viewed as akin to the head plumber or electrician rather than a critical business leader. By contrast, law and executive orders direct agencies to empower CIOs with broad authority over IT investments and cybersecurity. Given the functional bureaus’ responsibilities, it is reasonable that they should serve as “business owners” and play a major role in managing IT systems. However, a weak CIO and the lack of effective enterprise-wide strategies led, perhaps inevitably, to a reality in which individual bureaus zealously guard their tradi- tional prerogatives and funding. With IRM’s history of budget and human resources limitations, it is no surprise that other bureaus continue to directly create and manage core IT systems to carry out State’s critical HR, financial, consular, logistics, security and other functions. A Tower of Babel In practice, then, absent direction and assistance in aligning investments for the greater good of employees and organizational efficiency, bureaus can and do develop systems that respond to narrow requirements. Many vendors offer similar IT applications and platforms. Without the strategic guidance they often yearn for, bureaus inevitably end up picking differing, sometimes incompat- ible, tools to the detriment of overall efficiency and cost-effective- ness. This is especially damaging to operations at overseas posts, which typically do a better job than headquarters of integrating internal and interagency operations. Unfortunately, the “Wash- ington solutions for Washington problems” approach, in which bureaus focus on their own narrow requirements, leads to IT State lacks a centralized authority empowered to establish and enforce an enterprise-wide IT architecture for domestic offices and overseas missions.