The Foreign Service Journal, September 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2019 33 Pull together with partners. Despite problems of recogni- tion and funding, the fact that prevention is part of a continuum of responses to conflict means that, just like traditional stabi- lization operations, the process of creating a strategy for crisis prevention, identifying resources and engaging partners requires maximum buy-in from agencies and assets traditionally designed to respond to crises. On the ground, successful prevention of instability comes from a mix of understanding the local environment, building a team and gain- ing broad institutional support from local partners to address the driving factors of instability. This parallels the process for successful stabilization efforts in general. Indeed, most lessons from post-conflict stabilization operations apply equally well to pre-conflict stabilization efforts. To understand and adapt to a changing local environment, it is critical to develop and engage a network of local and international partners from a variety of sectors: government, international organizations, embassies, military, police, national disaster man- agement authorities, nongovernmental organizations and civil society. They can all help address the driving factors of instability, as well as identify the early-warning signs that may lead to a crisis. In contrast to the Iraq and Afghanistan models, however, the U.S. government is probably not going to be the dominant player on the field in a preventive stabilization operation. But even as a much smaller player, the design of a U.S. team is extremely important. It is critical to include the right mem- bers in decision-making and implementation processes, while recognizing respective differences in their mandates. In other words, there may be a “core” team group and “support” partner group(s), depending on the role and capability of each member. These could be U.S. government agencies, but more likely will be drawn from international organizations and local society. Practitioners noted, however, that while a U.N.-structured response could be very helpful in bringing in new outside partners such as China, Russia or other countries, in some cases a response can be hamstrung by being too inclusive. So, we con- cluded, the United Nations must find the best balance. Go for local solutions, locally led. The U.S. government may in some cases provide enthusiastic backing and support on the ground, which is great, of course. But more often, Washington will be reluctant to face facts about the severity of a problem. The same reluctance is prob- ably even more true of the local government. In some cases, this denial factor may be greater in pre-conflict than post-conflict situations. A festering conflict is often ignored until violence results. The challenge that practitio- ners identified is to make sure that the planning and implementation of a preventive stabilization operation are locally led. Partici- pants recounted horror stories of prevention efforts being under- mined by lack of host-government buy-in. Yet there is often real dedication to solutions at the most local level. One way to resolve some of these government-to-government conflicts might well be to work at the grassroots level first, with those directly affected in the situation. Rather than forcing things to improve from the top down, working from the bottom up may be more effective. It also avoids some of the immediate pitfalls and resource conflicts. Of course, a proper balance is needed. As success becomes evident, higher-level buy-in may be more likely. Put metrics first. Assessment criteria need to be established early and tested. The challenge of “proving prevention” is over- whelming, but it is made much worse if efforts are not tracked and measured from the beginning, and against a commonly agreed yardstick. Too often, assessment is an afterthought, when it needs to be part of the planning from the start. Enhancing the Chances of Success The Carlisle participants concurred that it is possible for international actors to prevent instability from growing past the point of no return. But it is extremely difficult to predict where instability will manifest, and determine how to invest meager resources to stop the process. However, our group of practitioners found a glimmer of hope in acknowledging some basic requirements: a thorough under- standing of the local environment and culture, a strong network of like-minded partners from both the international community and the local community, and a willingness to take modest risks with meager resources. This formula will not prevent every crisis, but it may allow us to forestall a few. And for that reason, it is certainly worth the relatively modest investment. n David Becker, in dark glasses, talks with colleagues during a visit to Cité Soleil in 2009. COURTESYOFDAVIDBECKER