The Foreign Service Journal, September 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2019 37 Strauss’s view, were the nature of the founding ideology and the calculations of local leadership about the course ahead. Once the prospect of political violence, with potential for mass atrocities and genocide, became likely, what might the international community have done to prevent it? It must be said that, in Rwanda, the international effort engaged every instrument in the peacemaking toolkit, from bilateral diplo- macy accompanied by material inducements and multilateral negotiations to deployment of an international peacekeeping mission. What more could the United States have done? At the begin- ning of the Rwanda conflict in 1990, we could have joined with France in forceful support of the Habyarimana regime’s defense of its territory against a cross-border insurgency. Or, we could have abetted the overthrow of the existing regime, known to be autocratic and corrupt, and replaced it with a caretaker regime (something both the internal opposition and the invading exiles wanted). Instead, convinced as we were that democratic governance, an open economy, the rule of law and power-sharing were solutions to the divisions tearing the Rwandan polity apart, we chose to urge the sides to agree to a sustainable cease-fire and then to negotiate a new governmental order for Rwanda. To keep the peace process on track, we could have moved for a more rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces after the signature of the 1992 cease-fire and the 1993 peace agreement. With forces in place, we could have more thoroughly investi- No matter what the levels of endemic malnutrition, landlessness or economic regression in Rwanda, it was human choice on the part of the rebels to pursue civil war to upend the existing regime.