The Foreign Service Journal, September 2019

40 SEPTEMBER 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL limited by only one thing, and that is their own estimate of the consequences to themselves. The question then arises as to what measures the democratic states have at their disposal for resisting totalitarian pressure and the extent to which these measures can be successful. That is a tremendous question, not one on which I can give you a com- plete answer. I don’t have a complete answer. … Measures at Our Disposal The first category of measures lies in the psychological field. It would be a mistake to consider psychological measures as anything separate from the rest of diplomacy. They consist not only of direct informational activity like propaganda, or radio broadcast, or distribution of magazines. They consist also of the study and understanding of the psychological effects of any- thing which the modem state does in the war, both internal and external. Democracies—ours especially—were pretty bad at psycho- logical measures in the past, because so many of our diplomatic actions have been taken not in pursuance of any great overall policy, but hit-or-miss in response to pressures exercised on our government by individual pressure groups at home. Now those pressures usually had little to do with the interests of the United States. They weren’t bound together in any way. It is only recently and probably in consequence of the experiences of the last 8 or 10 years that our government has begun to appreciate the fact that every- thing it does of any importance at all has a psychological effect abroad as well as at home. The second category of weapons short of war that we have at our disposal today is economic . Here, I’d like to give you a word of warning: it would be a mistake to overrate the usefulness of the economic weapons when they are used as a means of counterpressure against great totalitar- ian states, especially when those states are themselves economically powerful. This is particularly true of the Soviet Union, because the Soviet leaders consistently place politics ahead of economics on every occasion when there is a show- down. The Soviets would unhesitatingly resort to a policy of complete economic autarchy rather than compromise any of their political principles. I don’t mean they are totally uname- nable to economic pressure. Economic pressure can have an important cumulative effect when exercised over a long period of time and in a wise way toward the totalitarian state. But I don’t think it can have any immediate, incisive, or spectacular results with a major totalitarian country such as Russia. … On the strictly political measures short of war, I only mention one category because it, in my opinion, is our major political weapon short of war. That measure is the cultivation of solidar- ity with other like-minded nations on every given issue of our foreign policy. A couple of years ago, when we first had discus- sions with the Soviet authorities in Moscow about the possibility of setting up another United Nations Organization, I’ll admit that I was very skeptical. I was convinced the Russians were not ready to go into it in the same spirit we were. I was afraid the United Nations might become an excuse rather than a framework for American foreign policy. I was worried it might become a substi- tute for an absence of a policy. But I am bound to say, in the light of what has happened in the last year, I am very much impressed with the usefulness of the UN to us and to our principles in the world. There are advantages to be gained for us working through it. … All the measures I have been discuss- ing—economic, psychological and politi- cal—are not strictly diplomatic. Remember that diplomacy isn’t anything in a com- partment by itself. The stuff of diplomacy is in the entire fabric of our foreign relations with other countries, and it embraces every phase of national power and every phase of national dealing. The only measures I can think of which are strictly diplomatic in character are those involv- ing our representation in other countries. Those can be used for adjustment as well as pressure. …But you don’t have to break relations altogether. You can withdraw the chief of mission, reduce your representa- tion, or resort completely to non-inter- course. You can forbid your people to have anything to do with the other country. The measure which is most usually considered and used is the severance of Diplomatic Measures of Adjustment for the Redress of Grievances or for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes AMICABLE Non-Judicial • Negotiations • Good Offices, Mediation, and Conciliation • International Commissions of Inquiry Judicial • Arbitration • Adjudication • Charter of the United Nations NON-AMICABLE • Severage of Diplomatic Relations • Retortion and Retaliation • Reprisals • Embargo • Non-Intercourse • Pacific Blockade