The Foreign Service Journal, September 2020

22 SEPTEMBER 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL In the modern American family, with couples juggling two careers, single par- ents struggling with childcare options and everyone facing eldercare dilem- mas, the direct career path to flag rank may be elusive as officers balance work and home responsibilities. FSOs have always faced tough choices to maintain an overseas career, it is true, but societal change in recent decades has amplified those challenges. As enlightened as our agency may have become about work-life balance, the reality is that the career clock still offers just 27 years—and those with the flexibility to take the killer job will have a leg up. Those who take a “lateral” assignment to be near a parent, to go to a post that can meet the special needs of a child or to favor the career opportunity of a partner may well run out of time. The challenge may be even more pro- nounced in coming years as the depart- ment has again reduced the number of positions overseas in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan drawdowns. Another troubling aspect of the 27-year rule is its unfairness given sometimes wildly divergent opportuni- ties to demonstrate readiness for senior- level duties. From 2000 to 2010 there were huge percentage differences in promotion rates among the five areas of endeavor into which FSOs are divided: consular, economic, management, political and public diplomacy officers. FSOs in some areas stood a much better chance of moving into FS-1 positions early and demonstrating senior-level leadership over a span of several years. Selection boards are faced with a difficult job in discerning among a pool of capable, high-performing candi- dates, few of whommay have obvious blemishes. As such, they have almost no choice but to consider as stronger the candidate who has served exceptionally in a series of senior FS-1 or senior-stretch positions as compared to the candidate with a shorter résumé. This is the reality that may cut down any number of great candidates who take their time getting to FS-1 and then mix in at-grade but family- friendly jobs out of personal necessity. Finally, while we are inarguably a more representative diplomatic service today than we were in the 1950s, that diversity falls off precipitously in the senior ranks. It is worth considering whether the 27-year limit plays a role in that outcome. In recent reflections on the role of race and gender at the Depart- ment of State, some current and former officers have pointed to the assignment process as a barrier to advancement, arguing that they were passed over repeatedly for promotable jobs for which they were qualified. Given that assignments are likely to remain heavily influenced by the subjec- tive views of section heads, office direc- tors and various front offices, along with the “corridor,” there is no certain way to eliminate this potential bias. Relaxing the TIS limit—and possibly extending “Time in Class” limits at earlier grades— is one possible way to mitigate the harm and improve the chances that every employee will have several realistic shots at advancement. In short, the result of the current TIS threshold is that the Department of State, an institution built around human capital, is losing quality officers too early. This is a loss to our foreign policy. More, at a time when foreign audiences are questioning the inclusiveness and fairness of American institutions, the rule may be perpetuating an outdated profile among our senior ranks. A Few Small Repairs Given that our Service, like the military, probably still requires a time- limited mechanism to select its senior ranks and ensure pass-through within the system, radical changes to Senior Foreign Service selection might be ill- advised. Two modest changes, however, could substantially ease the costs to our diplomatic readiness and to our officers and their families. First, extend the 27-year TIS threshold to 30 years in recognition of the reality that equally effective officers in today’s Service will take different paths to FS-1—whether owing to divergent skill- code promotion rates, timeouts brought on by family crises or the vagaries of luck in landing (or not being able to take) that magically mentored job that opens opportunities. This is a change the Department of State can make with- out a change in law. Second, adopt a five-year noncareer appointment option for officers failing to cross the senior threshold. This appoint- ment would allow those choosing not to retire to work for five additional years, full time, bidding for jobs at their retire- ment rank. These appointees should face automatic retirement if they cannot find a job in the regular bid cycle (they either fill a need or they don’t). Such a five-year window would allow officers to contribute their experience Two modest changes could substantially ease the costs to our diplomatic readiness and to our officers and their families.