The Foreign Service Journal, September 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2020 53 An American Foreign Service officer assigned to an embassy in a country on the far periphery of Washington’s consciousness might see an analogous situation in the locals’ sincere, if mis- guided, belief that U.S. policymakers had a razor-sharp, constant focus on them. But the U.N. was different: the ubiquitous inter- est in what Washington thinks derived from pragmatic consid- eration of options rather than exotic conspiracy theories. And instead of calling on the Washington-obsessed locals as a U.S. Foreign Service officer assigned to an embassy abroad would do, I was an insider, seated at the table as one of the U.N. officials discussing U.S. policies. This often felt like an out-of-body expe- rience, as I listened to myself impartially explaining Washington policies rather than promoting and defending them as I had for nearly three decades of proud service as an FSO. Neither the Obama nor the Trump administration ever put me in a position where my oath of office to the United Nations was tested. I might have been the U.N.’s equivalent of a “political appointee,” a noncareer senior official, but Washington never issued political instructions to me. Soon after assuming her duties as U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Nikki Haley made a point of telling me directly that she understood that I worked for the U.N., not for her, and asked me to report back if anyone on her staff ever treated me otherwise. Staff at the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) would deliver démarches and non-papers in support of U.S. positions, but these were neither presented nor accepted as instructions. Of course, as one of the five permanent members of the Secu- rity Council (the P5) and as the U.N.’s largest contributor both of assessed (mandatory) contributions and voluntary funding (in dollar terms), the United States hardly needs to rely surrepti- tiously on a U.S. national in an Under-Secretary-General slot to have influence or gain understanding of U.N. Secretariat think- ing. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations can simply call the Secretary-General on the phone. Occasionally, the American respect for my U.N. status seemed to cross the line into curious indifference. When I returned from Pyongyang in December 2017—after the first U.N. political visit to North Korea in six years—at a time when war seemed imminent, many ambassa- dors to the U.N. came to see me for briefings, a standard part of the job. USUN never bothered (although Ambassador Haley did attend my consultations with the Security Council). At least I never had to worry about implicit or explicit Wash- ington orders. Not all U.N. member states resist the temptation of using their nationals in U.N. positions to advocate for their interests or report back to capitals, despite their nationals’ oaths of office as impartial international civil servants. An Interpreter of Washington So, if Washington has an admirable “hands-off” policy once U.S. citizens are named to high-level U.N. posts, why did the George W. Bush administration decide to lobby Ban Ki-moon to appoint a U.S. citizen to head DPA? Lynn Pascoe, my immedi- ate predecessor, was the first U.S. citizen to head DPA in 2007; Rosemary DiCarlo, my successor, is the third. Previously, American nationals typically headed the U.N.’s Department of Management, to maintain eagle-eyed scrutiny over the organization’s budget. But in time Washington con- cluded that the Under-Secretary-General for Management inside the Secretariat had less sway on budget issues than an active member state working through the budget committees that are part of the General Assembly structures. The Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, on the other hand, is the chief foreign policy adviser to the Secretary-General and is present in many, if not most, of the Secretary-General’s meetings on international peace and security issues, while the head of the Department of Management is not. That individual frequently travels with the Secretary-General and (at least under Ban Ki- moon) would be patched into the Secretary-General’s calls with foreign leaders. Thus, an American in that position can provide useful service for the Secretary-General in terms of interpreting or translat- ing Washington policies and predicting likely Washington responses. Depending on the issue, this may or may not serve Washington’s immediate interest directly. But it certainly serves the Secretary-General’s interest in understanding the views of the U.N.’s most powerful member state. To the extent that Wash- ington wants an informed Secretary-General, having an Ameri- can “translator” by his side makes sense over the longer term. A good example of the utility of this “translator” function occurred early in my tenure, when the Iranians invited Ban Ki- moon for a state visit to give the keynote address at the August 2012 Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran. Susan Rice, then U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and To the extent that Washington wants an informed Secretary- General, having an American “translator” by his side makes sense over the longer term.