The Foreign Service Journal, September 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2020 55 power in the name of global cooperation that it cannot always control. The “democratic” parts of the U.N. structures—the Gen- eral Assembly, most notably—will always attract attention (and, often, scorn) when the United States “loses” a vote, even though they are nonbinding. There is an obsession in the member state bodies with Israeli unilateral actions toward the Palestinians, while the Chinese mostly get a pass regarding the Uighurs. The Security Council, which alone has the authority to pass binding resolutions, is currently paralyzed on critical issues, and its frozen composition differs shamefully from current politi- cal, demographic, military and economic dynamics. Traditional peacekeeping seems ill-suited for today’s conflicts, with civil wars fusing with transnational terrorism and a resurgence of proxy wars. With China’s rise and Russian assertiveness, the United States cannot expect the same deference to its leadership in the U.N. that Washington enjoyed in the immediate post–Cold War period. With leaders and citizens looking inward, COVID-19 and the accompanying economic crisis have amplified the sense that the U.N. itself and multilateralismmore generally are in crisis. Yet only a few years ago, multilateralism and the United Nations showed powerful signs of innovation and relevance: take, for instance, the unprecedented, Security Council– approved mission (2013-2014) to remove the bulk of Syria’s chemical weapons and precursors; the four-country U.N. emer- gency Ebola mission (2014-2015); the approval of the U.N. Sus- tainable Development Goals (2015); the agreement on financ- ing for development goals and mechanisms (2015); the Paris Agreement on climate (2015); and the tripartite U.N. Mission in Colombia overseeing the disarmament of the FARC rebel group (2016-2017). This is not ancient history. These achievements demonstrate that the United Nations and the multilateral system can address collective challenges and act as force multipliers for U.S. interests. Behind these initiatives was strong U.S. leadership. Even now, despite the disdain the Trump administration too often demonstrates for multilateralism, no other country comes close to the influence the United States has inside the world body. In addition, for all its creakiness after 75 years, the United Nations remains a generally accepted vehicle for burden-sharing and cost distribution for shared problems that would be hard to rep- licate in today’s polarized world. (Imagine trying to get the U.N. Charter drafted today.) Today, every country is affected by the coronavirus, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that 170 countries will be significantly poorer at the end of 2020 than they were in January. Many countries are now coming to terms with systemic racism. Inequality between countries and within countries is growing. These overlapping crises are creating disruptions on a global scale that should spark action. Yet in the United States, the signs are not encouraging so far. We seem to be following a model mimicking the post–World War I abdication of responsibility rather than demonstrating 1945-style leadership and creativity. Some lessons of the postwar period can guide us today. After 1945 the United States fostered a series of overlapping institu- tions, alliances and partnerships, with varying memberships and objectives, all formed by member state governments. Today, a layered approach would need to include business and civil society representatives able to grapple with questions, say, of political oversight over technological advances or methods to de-escalate potential cyberwar. Starting such discussions in the United Nations would be frustrating and futile, given global polarization and the U.N.’s exclusively governmental member- ship. But once a broad consensus of governments, industry and civil society groups has agreed on acceptable standards of behavior, the U.N. is the only body that can endorse global appli- cability. We just need to keep our expectations realistic about when and how to use the United Nations. All of us who have toiled in Turtle Bay can identify parts of the U.N. that seem dysfunctional or irrelevant (although we may disagree exactly on which parts those are). I often teased my DPA staff that the organization made me realize just how nimble and flexible the State Department was—not words I used to describe State while serving there. Also compared to State, itself not always the most empathetic employer, the U.N. treats its own career staff abysmally, neglecting career development and too often ignoring staff welfare. In August 2019, when three The author, at left, with U.N. Special Representative for the Secretary-General Ghassan Salameh in Tripoli in March 2018. COURTESYOFJEFFREYFELTMAN