The Foreign Service Journal, September 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2021 51 lian Foreign Ministry learned about shortly after Shevardnadze’s visit. However, the head of the Havana section at the time, Curtis Kamman (one of the two FSOs dispatched to study Mongolian in the 1960s), remembers the conversation differently. Regardless of these perceived and actual overtures, Gor- bachev’s Vladivostok speech in July 1986, in which he said that Moscow was willing to withdraw its troops fromMongolia, was a signal that the USSR’s willingness to fully support the Mongolian state was waning. Coupled with Shevardnadze’s January com- ment, leaders in Ulaanbaatar saw that change was coming. Apparently as a result of back-channel efforts by both sides, the U.S. was sufficiently encouraged to seek negotiations through Ambassador Vernon Walters, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Walters made the approach in August, but reticence continued among some on the Mongolian side. In the fall of 1986, the new deputy assistant Secretary of State responsi- ble for China and Mongolia, J. Stapleton Roy, the other FSO who had studied Mongolian in the 1960s, arrived in Washington. As Roy recounts in his unpublished oral history interview for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, he “found … desultory interest” in Washington for establishing diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Not content with this state of affairs, he “gave the issue top priority” and began working to change the negotiating approach. His initiative coincided with the crumbling of resistance among the old guard in Ulaanbaatar. Negotiations were initiated on Dec. 12, 1986, and culminated in a joint signing ceremony on Jan. 27, 1987, in the Department of State—U.N. Ambassador Nyamdoo signing for Ulaanbaatar and Secretary of State George Shultz signing for Washington. U.S. Diplomats in Mongolia When the signing ceremony took place, Joe Lake had just gone to work in the Executive Secretariat of the Office of the Sec- retary. He attended the ceremony out of curiosity, never realizing the impact Mongolia would have on his future. Three years later he would be the first U.S. ambassador resident in Mongolia. Even though the U.S. now had a formal relationship with Mongolia, few in Washington were interested in building it. Mon- golia had spent 66 years in the Soviet orbit and had almost no understanding of how to work with Washington. This was com- pounded by the fact that there was no strong driving purpose on the American side; Mongolia did not factor into commercial or business considerations, and the U.S. no longer had a national security intelligence collection interest there. Roy, however, pushed the bureaucracy through the China Mongolia desk to open the small embassy on a shoestring budget. In March 1988 FSOs Steve Mann and Victoria Nuland arrived in Ulaanbaatar, and shortly thereafter, U.S. Embassy Ulaanbaatar formally opened its doors. Dick Williams arrived to present his credentials in September, but all three Americans soon departed the country because the department did not believe the new embassy was ready for the harsh Mongolian winter. In his September 1988 report on presentation of his creden- tials, Williams stated that key factors would “severely constrain” the Mongolia-U.S. relationship “even if the political atmosphere continues to improve.” Embassy Ulaanbaatar was now staffed entirely by local employees. Whether the political atmosphere continued to “improve” or not depends on your perspective, but it certainly changed, wildly and unexpectedly. In June 1989 two new FSOs, Michael Senko and Ted Nist, arrived and reopened the embassy. In December 1989 the embassy reported on a confluence of events including unexpected pro-democracy, anti–Communist Party mass demonstrations by young Mongolians that would produce a new generation of politi- cal leaders. The Mongolian government grappled with both the desires of the demonstrators and a changing geopolitical land- scape in their relationship with the Soviet Union. The old regime announced its resignation on March 9, 1990, and Mongolia began its struggle to create a new political and economic future. A Whole New World The end of communist rule gave impetus to the relationship with the United States. The beginning of 1989 saw the installation of the administration of President George H.W. Bush, and with it, James A. Baker III became U.S. Secretary of State. Baker’s interest in Mongolia, which long predated his appointment as Secretary, became crucial for Ulaanbaatar in garnering both U.S. and inter- national support in the challenging years ahead. On April 19, 1990, U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H. Solomon hosted a private lunch for Mongolian Ambassador Nyamdoo to introduce Joseph E. Lake, the not-yet-announced nominee to be the U.S.’s first resident ambassador to Mongolia. Nyamdoo asked Solomon about a In the early years of the Cold War, American interest in Mongolia was driven mainly by a desire to improve intelligence collection on the Soviet Union.