The Foreign Service Journal, September 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2022 31 U.S.EMBASSYBANGUI In Bangui in 2019, Assistant Secretary Tibor Nagy and Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn met with students at the Presidency. At center, from left: Central African Republic Minister of Higher Education Jean-Laurent Syssa Magalé (at the time rector of the University of Bangui), Tibor Nagy, Lucy Tamlyn, and University of Bangui Secretary General Dr. Jean Kokoide. in every country how extensive their Chinese connections had become. I quickly conducted a survey with our embassies there to find out howmany people we had promoting trade and investment compared to the PRC embassy, and the results were depressing. On average, China’s advantage was 3 to 1 in staffing— and in some missions we had only a part-time diplomat dedicated to trade, who might also have to do visas when the consular officer was unavailable. But at the same time, African leaders were telling me how eager they were for U.S. trade and investment, because they realized that American companies created the types of jobs their countries needed (and this included the autocrats, because they could also see the rising anger in their young people from lack of opportunities). I stated in many speeches that I couldn’t blame Africans for their deals with the PRC: For years, when they needed help with a project, the only one knocking on the door was Beijing. But, in general, Chinese projects don’t transfer technology, don’t provide local employment (beyond those turning a shovel) and don’t always respect the environment. Often they even bring in vendors from the PRC who replace local small businesses. In addition, given their opacity, deals with Beijing often leave a country with massive debt. Preliminary Initiatives We acted as quickly as possible, introducing the concept of embassy “deal teams,” enlisting every American at every African embassy to support two-way trade and investment initiatives that came their way. First introduced at Embassy Nairobi by then-Ambassador Bob Godec, the concept was then extended continentwide. On the U.S. side, the administration imple- mented two initiatives. One, Prosper Africa, involved taking a “whole of government” approach to supporting U.S. trade and investment. For decades, while U.S. embassies advised their host countries to set up a “one-stop shop” to promote trade and investment, the U.S. itself never did that. Prosper Africa did not create a new bureaucracy; instead, it linked together offices in 17 U.S. government agencies that dealt with supporting U.S.-Africa trade and investment in a one-stop- shop digital initiative to promote and support economic engage- ment in Africa at www.ProsperAfrica.gov. Wisely, the Biden admin- istration has continued this effort and will hopefully expand it. But the initiative is still in its initial implementation phase, and Congress is considering “Prosper Africa” legislation to give it a firm legal foundation. Three U.S. government agencies—State, Commerce and USAID—were key to Prosper Africa’s conception, and there was considerable discussion as to where the organiza- tion should reside. For now, the secretariat is located in USAID, but it needs an independent home to become truly effective. Second, we needed a way to provide flexible financing for U.S. companies willing to undertake projects in Africa if they were to be able to compete with PRC (and other) proposals. The administra- tion was able to transform the Overseas Private Investment Corpo- ration into the International Development Finance Corporation, double its capitalization to $60 billion and give it greater flexibility. But these initiatives are just a start, and China is not the only country seeking to expand its influence in Africa. In recent years Russia has been working hard to regain the influence it had during Soviet days. But without the Soviet Union’s heft and resources, Russia is limited to being opportunistic; it is focused on poking the U.S. and our Western allies in the eye where it can. Russia even fields mercenaries with close ties to Putin. One such, the Wagner Group, has been active in a number of African nations that suffer from instability; but instead of helping, they compound human rights violations and steal mineral riches. Beyond China and Russia, other major players—notably Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, Israel, India, the U.K. and the European Union—have all recog- nized Africa’s importance and are actively pursuing their own commercial, diplomatic and strategic interests. Despite our benign neglect and historical missteps, Africans are eager tomake us their preferred partner because we remain best positioned to help Africa achieve a promising future. We pos- sess many attributes that appeal to Africans, especially the youth.