The Foreign Service Journal, September 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | SEPTEMBER 2022 45 a unique U.S. politician who grasped their interests and voiced them in a way that Americans could understand. Ordinary Americans were also starting to notice the con- tinent. A 1950 remake of King Solomon’s Mines struck gold at the box office. John Ford’s “Mogambo” (1953) with Clark Gable, Ava Gardner and Grace Kelly, and John Huston’s “The African Queen” (1951) with Humphrey Bogart and Katharine Hepburn, were magnificently filmed on location. If such icons as Gable and Bogart could reinvent themselves in the heart of Africa, maybe the Dark Continent beheld a new frontier after all. In 1955, John Gunther’s thousand-page Inside Africa was a bestseller. Guinea: Ground Zero of Africa Policy Richard Nixon’s Africanist bona fides rested primarily on his March 1957 trip to Accra as Washington’s representative at Ghana’s independence celebrations. His widely publicized trip report recommended that a new Bureau of African Affairs be established at State, embassies be set up in every country and substantial economic development assistance extended. Regardless, Nixon eyed Kennedy warily. As the latter hammered the vice president’s failure in his report to mention Algeria, he provoked doubts about Nixon’s judgment and ability to over- come Cold War–driven policy deference to France. Believing Kennedy was wrong on Algeria and simply trying to upstage his own ownership of the Africa issue, Nixon drove the Eisenhower administration’s damage control in the speech’s aftermath. Attention soon shifted to another rebellious French colony. In September 1958, Guinea rejected French President Charles de Gaulle’s plan to grant its African colonies independence but remain tied to France economically. Furious, de Gaulle directed departing French officials to leave nothing of value behind, a punitive action that poisoned the Franco-Guinean relationship for decades to come. Sékou Touré thus took over a country eco- nomically shattered by de Gaulle’s wrath. While the Soviet Union jumped at the opportunity to befriend Guinea, Washington waffled, struggling to balance support for African independence with its alliance with France. No embassy opened for another eight months, and plans for an aid package stalled. Touré begged Eisenhower for more, insisting that neutral- ity was his objective. As evidence of his sincerity, he offered to visit the United States, which Washington accepted. The state visit, which occurred from Oct. 25 through Nov. 9, 1959, was the baptismal program of the new Bureau of African Affairs, which, with Nixon pushing hard, had opened its doors on Sept. 8. It also marked Touré’s first official travel beyond Africa as head of state; thus, its success meant as much to the new bureau as to the leader of the new country. Moreover, it elevated Nixon’s policy leadership. Ambassador to Guinea John Morrow recommended extended orientation travel around the United States. Touré himself wanted to see the South. Atlanta, Touré’s preferred choice, was dropped because of fear of a racially motivated slight by the governor of Georgia. Consequently, Governor Luther Hodges of North Carolina, Morrow’s home state, came to the rescue. Touré received an honorary degree from Mor- row’s recent employer, North Carolina College, then lunched with the president of crosstown (and segregated) Duke Uni- versity. He stayed the night in the venerable Carolina Inn in Chapel Hill as its first Black guest. After a stop in Chicago, Touré flew to Nixon’s Southern Cali- fornia, but curiously without Nixon. Instead, Kennedy seized the moment to helicopter dramatically into Disneyland to meet the Guinean. The visit climaxed in New York City with a tickertape parade and an exhibition of Guinean works at the New York Museum of Primitive Art, hosted by French-speaking Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Advantage Kennedy For the Guineans, Kennedy’s performance was the high point; Touré would follow the presidential campaigns of the next two years closely. In stark contrast to Kennedy, Eisenhower’s perceived ambivalence and sluggishness left the Africans cold. The nonverbal message communicated to Africans at the presi- dential level was that Africa still did not much matter. Moreover, the Republican who most impressed the Guineans was neither Eisenhower nor Nixon, but Rockefeller, considered the vice president’s main rival for the nomination. A sluggish image afflicted the final two years of the Eisen- hower administration. The president himself suffered two heart attacks that sapped his energy and contributed to the image of an out-of-touch old man. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ fatal illness during the second term deprived foreign policy of its prime advocate. Nowhere was this truer than in its approaches to Africa. Slow to respond and unable to anticipate the conse- quences of decolonization, the U.S. deferred to the Europeans. Nixon’s African efforts thus hit a wall, leaving the field open to Kennedy. Although Kennedy took over the new subcommittee on Africa in 1959, he ended up chairing only one session as he focused on his presidential campaign. Nixon’s repeated criticism that Kennedy was an absentee chair was on point,