The Foreign Service Journal, October 2003

by the way, is firmly in the “dia- logue” camp — as is this reviewer. Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth was assistant secretary of State for South Asian affairs from 1997-2001 and the U.S. representative for special politi- cal affairs to the United Nations from 1993-1997. He is currently a profes- sor at The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. Turf Battles The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military Dana Priest, W.W. Norton, 2003, hardcover, $26.95, 430 pages. R EVIEWED BY D AVID C ASAVIS The Department of State has long viewed the Department of Defense as a bureaucratic rival that has steadily encroached upon its turf overseas. As the second part of this book’s title, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military , suggests, the Pentagon has made its gains by portraying itself as reluctantly taking on new tasks assigned to it by policy- makers. Of course, such a perspec- tive overlooks the inconvenient fact that there already is a government department charged with oversee- ing America’s foreign policy. Washington Post reporter Dana Priest attempts to be neutral in describing this trend, which she pegs as beginning with the end of the Cold War but accelerating markedly during the Clinton administration. However, it becomes clear early in her account that she is decribing a fait accomplis. Even the few defenders of “traditional” diplomacy she interviews seem to have ruefully accepted second-class status: Priest quotes Amb. Joseph Presel, State’s man in Tashkent, as quipping, “I wish I could get someone from the State Department to pay this much attention.” The book begins with an overview of the various regional commanders-in-chief (CinCs) and a description of the extensive Ameri- can buildup in each one’s domain. For example, Gen. Anthony Zinni, the CinC of the Central Command’s 25 countries, pithily describes him- self and his fellow commanders as “proconsuls to the empire.” Priest’s vivid portrait of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cen- ters on his well-known fascination with high-tech warfare and bias toward special operations, as well as his tendency to berate his comman- ders. But what is surprising is how closely his views mesh with Foggy Bottom’s on a number of “turf” issues. At one point, he displays fury at how his department has drifted into its new role. “There is only one CinC under the Consti- tution and law,” he is quoted as say- ing to his staff, “and that is Potus” (the president of the United States). The second part of the book depicts how U.S. military operations have expanded in the post-9/11 era. Two statistics make the case con- vincingly: each regional CinC has a budget of $380 million a year, and has a long-distance aircraft and a fleet of helicopters at his disposal. In contrast, the Secretary of State is the only U.S. diplomat with a dedi- cated aircraft and a security entourage. Priest effectively uses a series of case studies that take us from Nigeria to Bolivia to Central Asia. But as we make the journey, there is a disturbing sameness throughout all areas of operation: everywhere, State is invisible. The diplomatic meetings held by the military are described as “uncomfortable and forced” — but the soldiers are shown as gamely trying to learn the language of diplo- macy and politics. “This is what we do. We spend most of our time accomplishing foreign policy objec- tives,” Maj. Mike Bownas is quoted as saying as he sat at the hot, sticky U.S. logistics base outside the Nigerian capital, Abuja. “We really are the CinC’s foreign policy tool.” That may sound like boasting. But consider the conflict between Ambassador Robert Gelbard in Jakarta and Admiral Dennis Blair, CinC of the U.S. Pacific Command. In Priest’s account, despite Gelbard’s best efforts, Blair handily outmaneuvers him both in Asia and on Capitol Hill, actually changing U.S. policy toward Indonesia. In short, State’s defenders need to take the message of this book very seriously and make the case that skillful diplomacy is a job for profes- sional practitioners, not the military. Otherwise, the Foreign Service risks O C T O B E R 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 65 B O O K S State’s defenders need to take the message of this book very seriously and make the case that diplomacy is a job for diplomats, not soldiers.