The Foreign Service Journal, October 2004

the world’s largest consumer of energy, was mainly after oil. They argued that Washington is more concerned with controlling Iraq’s oil holdings, which make up 11 per- cent of the world’s reserves, in order to dictate future global oil policies and pricing, than in liberat- ing an oppressed people or ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruc- tion. A Choice Between Coke and Pepsi America’s support for Israel, despite its violation of dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions related to its continuing occupation of Palestinian territories and oppression of the Palestinian people, has made it even more difficult for fellow Arabs to believe that the U.S. has any good intentions in the Middle East. Conspiracy theories abound regarding Washington’s plans, but frustration and resignation remain the dominant themes. The “Arab street” (the term used to refer to regional public opinion) briefly hoped for a “regime change” in the White House that would bring about a more balanced and credible approach to Middle East problems. This was most true while Howard Dean was (briefly) the front-run- ner for the Democratic nomination, running on a strong anti-war plank. But once he was forced out of the race and John Kerry cruised to the nomination, those hopes rapidly faded. (Even Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich, the most outspoken opponent of the war, abandoned his posi- tion at the Democratic Convention to back Kerry.) Arabs note with disquiet that both Kerry and his run- ning mate, Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, voted in October 2002 for the congressional resolution authoriz- ing Bush to attack Iraq. Both also voted in favour of the Patriot Act. That measure, under the guise of fighting the “war on terror,” gives the CIA, FBI and other police agen- cies unprecedented powers to spy on the American public, particularly Muslims and Arab-Americans, and to override constitutionally protected civil liberties. Then the Democratic National Convention, which people in the Arab world thought might show the differ- ence between the two main political parties in America, failed to offer an alternative to the Bush administration’s policies on two of the most critical issues for the Arab world: Iraq and Palestine. In his acceptance speech, Kerry seemed to go out of his way to stress his support for the occupation of Iraq and the crushing of the anti- U.S. insurgency, mainly criticizing Bush for not deploying more troops. He has also repeatedly proclaimed his support for the war on terror and the doctrine of pre-emptive war, which is the centerpiece of the Bush administration’s policy of using mili- tary force to topple unwanted gov- ernments. Even this late in the election campaign, there does not seem to be any serious debate on the ongoing war and occupation of Iraq. And adding insult to injury, the Democratic Party seems very active in trying to oust independent presidential candidate Ralph Nader from the race. Nader, who is an Arab-American of Lebanese origin, opposes the war in Iraq and has called for a bal- anced U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, most Arab observers see the choice between Bush and Kerry — at least on Mideast issues — as amounting to the difference between Pepsi and Coca- Cola. Much Is at Stake It is important to bear in mind that the Arab people and their non-democratic governments have different reasons for opposing U.S. policies. The regimes — especially the ruling families themselves — are concerned above all with their own survival, so they are highly critical of the U.S. for pressuring them to democratize. By contrast, the people of the region are hostile toward America for not fulfilling its promise to bring democracy to the region, and for con- tinuing to support both authoritarian regimes and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands. Still, beleaguered reform elements within Arab soci- eties, who are convinced that the transformation to democracy in their countries cannot be achieved without outside help, cling to the hope that America, regardless of who wins the elections in November, will pursue the pro- claimed “forward strategy for reform and democracy” in the Middle East. True, many have been disillusioned by the U.S. performance in Iraq so far, and by Washington’s F O C U S O C T O B E R 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 21 Beleaguered reform elements within Arab societies are alert for signs that the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative will eventually come to fruition.