The Foreign Service Journal, October 2004

months after he assumed office. After a Chinese jet fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 electronic surveil- lance plane off the coast of Hainan Island in the South China Sea on April 1, 2001, the Chinese plane crashed and the U.S. plane was forced down. The incident put relations between China and the United States to a severe test, but bilateral talks eventually resolved it, averting a potential confrontation. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, relations between the two countries began to warm. Washington sought Chinese support for the war on terrorism and also requested Beijing’s influence to bring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea into multilateral talks on the latter’s nuclear programs. At a meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Bangkok, in October 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George W. Bush reached a consensus on promoting the all-round development of a constructive and cooperative relationship. Since then, China and the United States — the most popu- lous country and the most developed, powerful coun- try, respectively, on the globe — have engaged in close cooperation on anti-terrorism, Iraq, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and other complicated issues. Citing that cooperation, several senior Bush admin- istration officials have spoken positively about the future of U.S.-China relations. On Sept. 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell said, in a major foreign poli- cy address at The George Washington University, that Sino-American relations are the best since former President Richard Nixon paid his first visit to China in 1972. Days later, at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly testified that the U.S.-China relation- ship “is on some fronts the best it has been in years.” Said Kelly: “It is marked by complementary and some- times common policies on a broad range of issues that are critical to U.S. national interests. The war on ter- rorism and critical regional security issues are two examples.” For China, Taiwan Is the Key As major trading partners, the two countries are tightly interwoven in an increasingly globalized econo- my, and the economy has become a vital element in the bilateral relationship. But it is Taiwan that remains the most important and sensitive issue in Sino- American relations, as it bears on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. In an interview in Beijing with the Washington Post on the eve of his visit to the United States in December 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive issue in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese gov- ernment’s position on upholding the one-China princi- ple “is rock-firm and defies all challenges,” he declared. The Chinese people “will not sit by and do nothing faced with provocative activities aimed at splitting the motherland.” Wen added: “So on the question of Taiwan, the U.S. side must be very straightforward in adhering to the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, and in opposing Taiwan independence.” In particular, Washington must adhere to the principle of the Aug. 17 (1982) communique and stop all arms sales to Taiwan. “This will fundamentally help maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. It will also be con- ducive to the advancement of the process of the peace- ful reunification of China. It will also be fundamen- tally helpful to the maintenance of world peace and stability,” Wen said. Nevertheless, on July 15, 2004, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a joint resolution concerning Taiwan, reiterating the U.S. commitment to sell arms to Taipei under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (enacted in 1979, shortly after the U.S. government severed ties with Taipei in order to shift diplomatic recognition to Beijing). And two days later, on July 17, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said China firmly opposed the resolution and the Taiwan Relations Act, which had infringed on China’s sovereignty and intervened in its internal affairs. No Clear Preference As November approaches, Chinese interest in the U.S. presidential election is slowly growing. But most Chinese still haven’t developed a preference for either candidate. While most disapprove of the Bush admin- istration’s unilateralism, its pre-emptive strike policy and, most of all, its arms sales to Taiwan, they know lit- tle about Sen. Kerry, and even less about his views and polices on China. F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 4