The Foreign Service Journal, October 2004

— it is scarcely possible to imagine that the transatlantic alliance could be rebuilt during a second Bush term. The personal animosities and ideologi- cal divisions run too deep to imagine a serious rapprochement between Washington and Paris or Berlin. The best that could be hoped for would be a sullen agreement to disagree. Politically — and this is another of those paradoxes —a Bush victory might well be more comfortable for France and Germany than a victory by Mr. Kerry. Mr. Chirac and Mr. Schroeder, both weak at home, have profited polit- ically from the rift with Washington. A re-elected Mr. Bush would spare them the difficult questions. By con- trast, it would strike at the heart of Mr. Blair’s strategic ambition to restore the equilibrium between Britain’s twin relationships with its European allies and the U.S. For all his closeness to Mr. Bush — and his quarrels over Iraq with Mr. Chirac and Mr. Schroeder —Mr. Blair subscribes to the foreign policy doc- trine first enunciated a half-century ago by Conservative Prime Minister Harold MacMillan after Britain’s retreat from Suez. That places Britain as a pivotal player — a bridge, in the prime minister’s favoured metaphor, between Europe and the U.S. This role, however, depends critically on a healthy transatlantic alliance. If the alliance is broken, as it has been for the past two years, Britain is forced to choose between America and Europe — and thus is less able to leverage influence on one side of the Atlantic to enhance its influence on the other. So, if Mr. Blair’s heart is with Mr. Bush, his head is with Mr. Kerry. F O C U S 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 4 Mr. Blair’s ambition is to restore the equilibrium between Britain’s twin relationships with its European allies and the U.S.