The Foreign Service Journal, October 2004

L E T T E R S 8 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 4 work, which we could not have done without having a reliable care- giver at home. For example, on 9/11 I was in Indonesia’s Papua Province on the island of New Guinea, 3,000 miles and nine hours from Jakarta by plane. My spouse was in Bali as one of the main orga- nizers for a multi-country confer- ence. We were not able to return to Jakarta for a couple of days, and the embassy went on authorized depar- ture two weeks later. Our caregiver has traveled several times alone with our child to stay with our fam- ilies — and even back to her coun- try to stay with her family. We have done this explicitly so that they are both comfortable traveling alone, in case an emergency requires both of us to remain at post. We consider our caregiver a member of our family, and we are considered part of her family. She has lived with us since the day our child was born, and before that cared for a relative’s children for 20 years. The omission of this issue from this article (even though I sent input to the author) and the cursory treatment of most MOH categories (elderly parents, other family mem- bers, and heterosexual live-in part- ners) suggest that the Journal ’s intent was not to really examine all sides of an issue that does need addressing, but to advocate for the interests of selected constituencies. I thought AFSA was supposed to look out for all FSOs’ interests. Elaine Samson FSO Embassy San Jose The Senior Seminar Bill Stedman addressed an impor- tant subject in his recent “Speaking Out” article on the demise of the Senior Seminar (July/August). He deserves kudos for bringing the issue to the public forum, and his long- term perspective is instructive. As a proud member of the 42nd Seminar (1999-2000), I can testify to both the strengths and weaknesses of the program in recent years, but Bill’s essay essentially asks us to con- sider what the Seminar “should be” and then reminds us of the real source of any problems that may have been used to justify its demise: “such situations reflect failures with- in the assignment process, not prob- lems with the Senior Seminar itself.” He is right. The same point can be made for the quality of intellectual content and purposefulness of its curriculum, which thanks to im- proved leadership and rigor has now been linked to current foreign policy strategic goals and objectives and longer-term emerging issues, as they relate to the U.S., both internation- ally and domestically. This is essen- tial material on which future leaders should reflect. The reality is that the Seminar has always been a reflection of the institution and the people who sus- tain it. Any problems with it only beg that we look at ourselves and fix what is really broken. Stedman’s article is a timely reminder of that. My personal hope is that in the not too-far-distant future State will regain the will, the resources and the intellectual and managerial mettle to restore the Seminar to what it should be — the most advanced and highest quality execu- tive training for foreign policy and diplomacy professionals in the U.S. government, selection for which indicates promotability into or through the executive ranks. Stephanie Smith Kinney 42nd Senior Seminar FSO, retired Director, Strategic Planning, Keane Federal Systems Washington, D.C. Back to Basics I am a recently retired FSO, hav- ing left the Service in 2003 out of Panama, where I was the superviso- ry general services officer. A friend sent me a copy of the June 25 AFSA State VP e-mail update. I was par- ticularly interested in the “Extreme Diplomacy” section of this update. The first question that came to mind after digesting the fact that Baghdad will be the largest embassy in the world was — why? Haven’t we (the U.S. government) humiliat- ed ourselves enough by sending at least 900 U.S. military men and women to die in a place to which they should never have been sent? The second thing that came to mind was a question: Is the depart- ment going to supply the targets to be stitched to the back of every embassy staff member to make it easier for the radicals in Iraq to shoot or bomb them? Why do we insist on following this ongoing, dis- astrous policy? Time has more than adequately shown that we cannot even protect our own military personnel in Iraq, let alone the large numbers of U.S. contractor employees sent there, by virtue of the extremely lucrative (mostly single-bid) contracts hand- ed out by State and DOD plus other agencies. We certainly do not have the ability to protect every member of this vast embassy staff 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Once we send these 800 staff to Iraq, what are they going to do? It is my guess that all the agencies involved are being overwhelmed by testosterone attacks, feeling left out of the scramble for the war “glory” (and perhaps the budget bulges) enjoyed so far by DOD, CIA and State. It is a “pack” mentality of “monkey see, monkey do.” I wonder how long that bravado will last when