The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

isn’t stupid. For if the Iraq War has proved costly, hostilities against Iran would make it seem like a church supper. Here are some reasons why. • Iran is about four times the size of Iraq and its cities are iso- lated across vast deserts. (Recall the lost helicopters of Desert One.) • Its population, almost three times that of Iraq, has the same three large factions: Sunni, Shia and Kurds. But unlike its west- ern neighbor, Iran is 90 percent Shia, and its people have historically remained united in times of great stress. • Although a majority of the country certainly wants reform of the ruling clerical regime, Iranians are intensely proud nationalists. Decades of British, Russian and American domination have left them fear- ful that outsiders seek their oil and want to weaken their sovereignty. • The country has tens of thousands of experienced and fanatical fighters organized into small cells com- mitted to defend their homeland. An American inva- sion would drive many more citizens to join that defense. For all these reasons, fighting Iran would be bloody and never-ending. Oil prices (already at record highs) would skyrocket, U.S. debt would soar and the dollar would plunge. Washington (and Israel) would stand alone in the world without the dubious “coalition of the willing” President Bush boasts of in Iraq. Nor would the fighting be limited to Iranian territo- ry. Heretofore, Iran (which, unlike some of its neigh- bors, has not invaded another country in over 200 years) has been largely passive in response to American initiatives in the region. It has even been helpful in sta- bilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. But in the event of a U.S. inva- sion, that stance would likely morph into subversion and even active support for insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere. Those who are concerned about Iranian- backed terrorism could see their worst conjectures come to life. Other Means of Pressure? While an invasion would be madness, precision attacks on sus- pected Iranian nuclear facilities would be almost as damaging to American interests at home and abroad. If, as Vice President Cheney foreshadowed earlier this year, Israel decided to repeat in Iran its 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, the U.S. would be totally identified with its ally even if Jerusalem acted com- pletely on its own. Furthermore, some observers think the Israeli bombing actually spurred Saddam Hussein to acceler- ate and hide his program to develop nuclear weapons. Certainly that would be a predictable reaction in Tehran as well, driving it to seek a deterrent against pre-emptive action by Washington and Jerusalem. As for other pressure tactics, we already know that a quarter-century of American sanctions only produced Iranian resentment without changing Tehran’s behav- ior. As CEO of Halliburton, Vice President Cheney understood that history, and opposed unilateral sanc- tions. But maybe the administration is just talking tough, playing bad cop to the Europeans’ good cop. Or per- haps the White House has learned that heightening tensions and fear at home bolsters perceptions of pres- idential leadership. Whatever the explanation, the tac- tic is badly chosen. Threatening Tehran could have unforeseen consequences. Let’s step back in this argument. Having discussed problems inherent in responding violently to a feared Iranian nuclear weapon, we should examine what lies behind those fears. But first, the context: Nukes are one of the litany of four charges Washington has lev- eled at Tehran for decades. The other three — abuse of human rights, support for terrorism and opposition F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 Henry Precht, a retired Foreign Service officer who was country director for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis, has followed Iranian affairs for over 30 years. He is the author of A Diplomat’s Progress: Ten Tales of Diplomatic Adventure in and around the Middle East (Williams & Company, 2005). While an invasion would be madness, precision attacks on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities would be almost as damaging to American interests at home and abroad.