The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

close scrutiny. It has since estab- lished that Iran has egregiously breached the safeguards agree- ment which was designed to keep its nuclear activities transparent and limited to peaceful purposes. These breaches include Iran’s fail- ure to report the purchase of nuclear materials and to declare the existence of several of its nuclear sites.” Confirming this information, IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei said in a Washington Post interview last spring, “Iran has clearly cheated in the past. Corrective action was taken. Now they say they are embarking on a new path of cooperation, and since then they are cooperating. If they are still cheating, we haven’t seen any evidence of that.” ElBaradei has also stated that the hidden activities were not related to a weapons program, that any nuclear program could be used to make bombs, but the develop- ment of nuclear energy makes economic sense and is perhaps inevitable in Iran and elsewhere (and, I might add, to the West’s benefit by freeing up oil for export). Incidentally, the Bush administration tried to prevent Mr. ElBaradei from being elected to a third term as head of the agency, but abandoned the campaign when no other candidates came forward. Iran admits it acquired nuclear equipment on the black market from the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan net- work, but says it declined offered guidance for assem- bling a bomb. Tehran insists it is only seeking nuclear power for peaceful purposes as guaranteed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although hiding purchases on the black market and nuclear sites from the IAEA is plainly a violation worthy of suspicion, does it merit the threats coming from Washington? One could argue that sanctions, threats and reports of U.S. spying — and memory of the Israeli bombing of Osirak — are under- standable reasons for trying to keep nuclear activity hid- den from Pentagon eyes. In late February, to the great displeasure of Washington, Iran and Russia signed an agreement for the provision of nuclear fuel for the power plant at Bushire beginning next year and continuing for 10 years. The agreement stipulates that spent fuel would be returned to Moscow so that it could not be used for weapons. Later, Secretary Rice offered support to the European negotiations by agreeing to remove the block to Iranian membership in the WTO and to consider provi- sion of spare parts for civil aircraft. The initial Iranian reaction was dismissive as insufficient, but talks continued. In August the Euro- peans made their final offer to Iran: economic incentives, includ- ing a “guaranteed” supply of en- riched uranium for its power plants, if Iran permanently gave up the NPT-authorized right to enrich its own uranium. Iran, having repeatedly made plain that it insisted on controlling all stages of nuclear power production from mining uranium to power generation, dismissed the European proposal and has taken steps towards resuming enrichment. At this writing, there are two possible scenarios: either Iran and the Europeans will resume talks in a fur- ther search for a compromise, or the IAEA will condemn Iran and refer it to the U.N. Security Council for a vote on sanctions. There is now little likelihood that the U.S. and Europeans can muster the necessary votes in the IAEA, and less chance that the Security Council will impose sanctions without drawing a Chinese or Russian veto. Should sanctions be imposed, the result could well be that Iran would renounce the Non-Proliferation Treaty and end all inspections. For these reasons, the prospect is for continued talk, despite Washington’s pref- erence for toughness. Washington’s continuing pressure bolsters the clerical regime and sours ordinary Iranians on the U.S. — a great loss, as they are among the few Middle Easterners with friendly feelings for America. Virtually all Iranians, bitter opponents and loyal supporters of the regime alike, believe their country must have nuclear power if it is to have a growing economy like India and China. On this, the mullahs are no different from Shah Pahlavi; recall that he successfully wooed American companies and the State Department during the 1970s to work toward that goal. The Jury Is Still Out The case against Iran at this stage does not merit a guilty verdict, but rather deferred judgment. Still, let us not allow benefit of the doubt to obscure realism. At some point in the future, Iranian insecurity may well mean Tehran will move from its declared peaceful F O C U S 34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 Washington’s continuing pressure bolsters the clerical regime and sours ordinary Iranians on the U.S.