The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. Whether Pyongyang has “facilities” to enrich uranium or is in the process of building them it has yet to clarify. That discussion could begin if Washington engages in direct dialogue with its foe. Most important, the proposed freeze covers “even products achieved through reprocessing,” which meant putting the plutonium acquired in 1994— five to six bombs’ worth — back under inspection. In return, Pyongyang wants Washington to “participate” in providing heavy fuel oil promised under the Agreed Framework, take it off the list of “state sponsors of terrorism” and lift related sanctions. North Korea’s negotiating stance is intended to drive home the point that if the United States remains its foe, it feels threatened and will seek nuclear arms to counter that threat. Conversely, if the United States takes steps to end its enmity, it will reciprocate. North Korea insists on dealing directly with the United States, whether or not China, South Korea, Japan and Russia are also at the negoti- ating table, because none of them can provide such assurances on behalf of the United States. Direct dialogue is also the least a state can do to end enmity. To refuse to talk face-to-face is to deny the DPRK’s legitimacy as a state. Testing the Waters For the past four years the United States has watched North Korea arm without trying what South Korea and Japan think just might get it to stop: negotiating in earnest. Instead, the Bush administration prefers to demonize North Korea as a rogue state and stick with a crime-and-punishment approach to disarming it. This is not surprising, given that most hard-liners are unilateral- F O C U S O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 43 T HE R EMINGTON American hard-liners like John Bolton were convinced that Iraq’s fate would chasten North Korea.