The Foreign Service Journal, October 2005

ists who could not care less what allies think. (As the Journal went to press, news came of a tentative agreement at the six-party talks.) The Bush administration insists that the six-party talks are succeeding in isolating North Korea and that additional pres- sure by China and others will bring it to heel. And if not, well, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang will at least drive Seoul and Tokyo further into Washington’s arms. But many Asians see a negotiated resolution as both desirable and possible. Indeed, the Washington hard- liners’ uncompromising stance has led some in Seoul and Tokyo to wonder whether they can rely on the U.S. for their security. That suspicion is threatening to unravel U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia and enhance China’s influence there. Indeed, far from isolating the North, Washington is itself becoming odd man out in the region, dissi- pating political support for pres- suring Pyongyang and enhanc- ing China’s influence. The great divide in American foreign policy thinking is between those who believe that to get its way in the world the United States has to push other countries around, and those who think that cooperation can sometimes reduce threats to security. Does Pyongyang mean what it says? The surest way to find out is sustained diplomatic give-and-take. That will require the United States to make a strategic deci- sion to spell out the steps it is prepared to take to end enmity if North Korea eliminates its nuclear weapons programs — and this time carry them out. n F O C U S 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5 The crime-and-punishment approach — unlike reassurances and inducements — has failed to dissuade states from seeking their own nuclear arsenals.